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ABSTRACT
The accounting profession as a whole has been re
ceiving more and more attention from several sectors of the
business environment, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the government.

This attention has been

directed toward a study of the accounting practices of pub
licly owned corporations and their auditors by the United
States Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Manage
ment.

This study and other inquiries into the practices of

the accounting profession are indicative of the need for
the accounting profession to consider possible areas of self
regulation.

The area which is being explored here is the

selection, rotation and retention of independent auditors.
Accordingly, the objectives of this study are threefold:
(1) to examine the advantages and disadvantages of the rota
tion of auditors,

(2) to survey accountants in public prac

tice and controllers in industry for their opinions on a
policy of rotation of auditors, and

(3) to examine the re

sults of the survey and determine whether or not the account
ing profession should adopt a policy which requires rotation
of auditors.
This study began by examining the advantages and
disadvantages of rotation of auditors through a study of
viii

material previously published, thereby accomplishing objec
tive one.

The advantages of rotation which were discussed

include the maintenance of independence, the securing of a
fresh point of view and the possible reduction of litiga
tion =<gainst accountants.

The disadvantages, which were

discussed, include the loss of large clients by CPA firms,
the adverse effects of installing new auditors, the experi
ence and information loss from previous audits, and the
disruption of types of services offered to the client.
A questionnaire was sent to practicing accountants
and controllers for their opinions, thereby accomplishing
the second objective.

The questionnaire, which explored the

practices of selecting, rotating, and retaining independent
auditors, was sent to the controllers of the Fortune 500
companies and to a select group of CPA firms.

The CPA

firms included the firms in the group known as the "Big 8"
and "Big 7" firms.

Responses from the controllers totaled

339, for a 67.8% response rate.

Responses from the CPA

firms totaled 10, for a 66.67% response rate.

A policy of

automatically changing independent auditing firms on a rou
tine basis was not favored by 322 of the controller respond
ents

(96.12%).

The CPA respondents who did not feel that

the future would hold a policy of compulsory rotation of
CPA firms among clients totaled 8 (80%).
The results of the survey in this study indicated
that the accounting profession and the business sector do
not favor any changes in the policies governing the

selection, rotation and retention of independent auditors.
However, this writer feels that it would be better for the
accounting profession to implement a policy of rotation of
auditing firms among clients voluntarily rather than have
such a policy imposed upon the profession by an outside
agency, be it the United States Congress or the Securities
and Exchange Commission.

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The accounting profession as a whole has been re
ceiving more and more attention from several sectors of the
business environment, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the government.

This attention has been

directed toward a study of the accounting practices of
publicly owned corporations and their auditors by the United
States Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Manage
ment.

The results of this study, known as The Accounting

Establishment, and other inquiries into the practices of
the accounting profession are indicative of the need for the
accounting profession to consider possible areas of self
regulation.

The area which is being explored here is the

selection, rotation and retention of independent auditors.
Reliance of Businesses on Accountants
For years the accounting profession has been grow
ing at a rapid pace.

The amount of work carried out by

accounting firms has increased significantly over the past
ten years.

As businesses grow from small concerns to multi

level organizations, their need for competent accountants
grows also.

Once a business firm establishes a working

1

2
relationship with a competent accounting firm, the tendency
is for that business to continue the good relationship as
long as possible.

Accountants also lean toward maintaining

the relationship with good, longstanding clients.
On the surface, there is nothing wrong with the
building up and maintaining of good, successful business
relationships between clients and accountants.

However,

over a period of time, it may become evident that manage
ment is exercising some influence over the independent
accountant's audit procedure.

This might tend to reduce

the auditor's degree of independence and his objectivity.
Company Formation of an Audit Committee
An accountant is generally engaged to examine the
financial statements of a company and issue an objective
opinion on those statements.

The board of directors of any

company places heavy emphasis on the statements and accom
panying opinion of the outside auditor.

As the directors

of the company receive more pressure from the company stock
holders to examine management's activities and safeguard
the company assets, the board of directors in turn looks to
the outside, independent auditor for help in examining the
financial statements and consequently, the activities of
management.
To enable the board of directors to better under
stand the function of an independent outside auditor and
the work which he performs for the company, many companies

3
have established what is known as an audit committee.

Audit

committees help directors of a company to examine closely
the audit function and to understand the importance of an
independent audit.

Directors become more aware of the dif

ference between management, which operates the business, and
the board of directors, which checks on management and
determines broad policy.
The use of an audit committee to better serve the
interests of companies and their stockholders has received
considerable attention.

In January of 1977, the New York

Stock Exchange issued an "Audit Committee Policy Statement"
in which a definite date was set for the formulation of an
audit committee by each domestic company listing common
shares of stock on the New York Stock Exchange.

The audit

committee must be formed no later than June 30, 1978 .'*'
Audit committees mainly do two things.

The first

responsibility is to examine the outside auditor's manage
ment letter.

The second responsibility is to appoint the

independent auditor for the firm.

New members of audit com

mittees frequently find that once this second responsibility
is carried out, there is opposition to changing the appointed
outside auditor.
be the case.

The question arises as to why this should

Do companies want long, continuing management-

"*"R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann, Corporate Audit
Committees:
Policies and Practices (Altamonte Springs,
Florida:
The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc., 1977),
p. 19.
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auditor relationships in order to influence the auditor?
Or are companies opposed to changing auditors for other
reasons?

2

The interests of the stockholders, which the board
of directors is elected to protect, is best served by the
examination of the statements by a completely independent
auditor.

Some companies are therefore considering the

question of adopting a policy of rotating the Certified
Public Accounting firms which serve them as independent
auditors.

3

Such a policy could affect the accounting pro

fession considerably.

Rather than leaving the adoption of

such a policy to industry, which auditors serve, it would
appear to be better to have the accounting profession
investigate the need for the rotation of auditors.
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA
The American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants has addressed itself to the problem of improving the
practice of accounting before the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

In September of 1977, the Council of the AICPA

adopted a resolution which established a new division of
the AICPA.

The division is composed of a "SEC Practice Sec

tion" and a "Private Companies Practice Section."

Both of

these sections have similar objectives.
2

Robert K. Mautz, "Rotation of Auditors," Financial
Executive, Vol. 42 (July, 1974), pp. 48-49.
^Ibid.
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The SEC Practice Section has set forth the follow
ing four objectives:
1.
2.

3.

4.

Improve the quality of practice by CPA firms
before the SEC through the establishment of
practice requirements for member firms.
Establish and maintain an effective system of
self-regulation of member firms by means of
mandatory peer reviews, required maintenance
of appropriate quality controls and the im
position of sanctions for failure to meet
membership requirements.
Enhance the effectiveness of the section's
regulatory system through the monitoring and
valuation activities of an independent over
sight board composed of public members.
Provide a forum for development of technical
information relating to SEC practice.4
Several requirements for membership of

CPA

the SEC practice division were set forth by the AICPA.

firmsin
The

following requirement ties in closely with the second ob
jective stated above which calls for an effective system of
self-regulation:
Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of
each SEC engagement which has had another audit
partner in charge for a period of five consecutive
years and prohibit such incumbent partner from re
turning to in charge status on the engagement for
a minimum of two years. . . .5
This requirement establishes a policy of mandatory rotation
of the

audit partners which is one step toward a form of

self-regulation.

However, it is possible that

the account

ing profession should go further in the area of
4

"The AICPA Division of CPA Firms," The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. 144 (November, 1977), p. 113.
^Ibid.

6
self-regulation.

The profession should examine whether or

not the rotation of auditors, that is, audit firms, should
be adopted within the accounting profession as a whole.
The Nature of the Problem
The overall problem of this study is to determine
whether or not a policy of rotation of auditors should be
considered by the accounting profession as a whole.

The

questions which immediately arise are primarily the follow
ing :
1.

What are the advantages of rotating auditors?

2.

What are the disadvantages of rotating audi
tors?

These two areas are explored and discussed through a review
of the professional literature.
naire,

In addition, a question

to be explained later, presents the opinions of con

trollers and

CPAs regarding the selection, rotation and re

tention of independent auditors.
If some companies feel that accountants are compro
mising their professional standing by maintaining long
standing relationships with clients, then it is necessary
to look at a way to re-establish the outside auditor as a
completely independent examiner of financial statements.
The Scope of This Study
This

study is oriented toward the accounting pro

fession as a whole within the United States.

Practical

7
considerations necessitated the restrictions placed on the
scope of this study.
Limitations of the Study
This study is limited to gathering the opinions of
the controllers of the five hundred largest industrial
companies in the United States and a select group of CPA
firms.

In order to determine whether or not there should

be a policy regarding rotation of auditors, it is necessary
to question those persons in industry who deal with audi
tors as well as the auditors themselves.
The field of empirical research has been limited to
the controllers of the five hundred largest industrial
companies on the basis that they represent the largest
businesses in the United States.

In addition, it is their

close associations with independent accountants which give
rise to concern by third parties over their possible influ
ence over independent auditors.

These five hundred com

panies collectively are in a good position to exert influ
ence from the business sector over the general practices
and procedures of the accounting profession as a whole.
previous study of auditor changes done by John C. Burton
and William Roberts explained their use of the Fortune's
500 list as follows:
Fortune's 500 list was used because it included
the bulk of the unregulated large corporations
which require auditor's opinions. We felt that
large firms were crucial in considering the public

A
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interest associated with the attest function, both
because they control a substantial proportion of
the country's resources and because their economic
power over public accounting firms is potentially
the greatest.^
The second group of opinions is gathered from a
small group of CPA firms known as the "Big 8" and the "Big
7."

According to the Senate Subcommittee on Reports,

Accounting and Management, the "Big 8" firms are very
powerful and influential.
but not nearly as large.

The "Big 7" are also important
The report of the subcommittee

stated the following:
These eight firms are so big and influential in
relation to other accounting firms that they domi
nate the practice of accounting in the United States
and probably throughout the world.
The influence exercised by the "Big 8" firms
far exceeds that which might be expected from the
number of CPAs working for them.
Only about 11 or
12 percent of the nation's estimated 160,000 CPAs
are associated with "Big 8" firms, but their influ
ence is magnified because their clients are the
largest and wealthiest corporations in the United
States.
Because of their large size, the "Big 8"
firms exercise substantial influence directly on
accounting practices promulgated or approved by the
Federal Government.
They also exercise substantial
indirect influence through the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which they
control, and through the accounting practices fol
lowed by their corporate clients.?
g

John C. Burton and William Roberts, "A Study of
Auditor Changes," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 123
(April, 1967), p. 32.
7
U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reports,
Accounting and Management of the Committee on Government
Operations, The Accounting Establishment:
A Staff Report,
S. Doc. No. 95-34, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977 (Wash
ington, D. C . : Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 4-5

9
In selecting the controllers of the five hundred
largest industrial companies and the "Big 8" and "Big 7"
firms, the results of the survey reflect the opinions of
the persons who use the largest auditing firms as well as
the opinions of those who perform the work.

Of the 500

companies surveyed, 4 95 or 99% of them are audited by the
"Big 8" and the "Big 7" CPA firms.
Limitations of a Questionnaire
The questionnaire distributed in this study is sub
ject of the limitations inherent in the questionnaire
technique.

Such limits include the interpretation of

questions differently by respondents, the confusion over
terminology used and the possible result of a poor response
rate.

The advantages of a questionnaire are twofold.

It

allows a researchers to contact persons over a large geo
graphical area.

In addition, the questionnaire allows a

respondent to reply to the questions at his own conveni
ence .
Objectives of This Study
The objectives of this study are threefold:
1.

To examine the advantages and disadvantages
of the rotation of auditors.

2.

To survey accountants in public practice and
controllers in industry for their opinions
on a policy of rotation of auditors, and

10
3.

To examine the results of the survey and
determine whether or not the accounting
profession should adopt a policy which re
quires rotation of auditors.

The accounting profession is constantly growing
and changing, as is the overall size of industry.

As a

result of the increasing size of business and the greater
need for audits performed by certified public accountants,
the pressures felt by accountants have increased.

It may

therefore be necessary to consider the adoption of a
policy within the accounting profession regarding the rota
tion of auditors among companies.

This study is aimed at

helping the accounting profession decide whether a policy
of rotation of auditors is needed.
Research Methodology
This study begins to look at the subject of rota
tion of auditors by examining the advantages and disad
vantages of such a policy.

By studying the advantages and

disadvantages, a more thorough understanding of what such
a policy means was made clear.

This first objective was

> •

accomplished by examining material already published.

The

results of this research are presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
In preparation for achieving the second objective
of surveying accountants and controllers for their opinions,
a questionnaire was formulated for each group which ex
plored the practices of selecting, rotating, and retaining

11
independent auditors.

In addition, the questionnaires

asked for opinions as to whether a policy of rotation of
auditors should be adopted by the accounting profession.
The questionnaires were submitted to the controllers of
the Fortune 500 companies and to a select group of CPA
firms to obtain their opinions.

The questionnaires along

with the transmittal letters are presented in Appendix A.
The questionnaire for the controllers was sent to
each of the controllers of the companies included in the
Fortune's 500 grouping.
sented in Appendix B.
March 1, 1978.

A list of these companies is pre
The questionnaire was mailed

All useable responses received on or before

March 31, 1978, were included in the results which were
processed by a computer program.

The total responses were

339; the response rate was 67.8%.
335 were useable.

Of these 339 responses,

Four respondents stated an inability to

participate in the survey.
The questionnaire for the CPA firms was sent to a
partner in charge in the home office of each of the "Big
8" and "Big 7" firms.

The firms in the "Big 8" grouping

are as follows:
Arthur Andersen and Company
Arthur Young and Company
Coopers and Lybrand
Ernst and Ernst
Haskins and Sells
Peat, Marwick and Mitchell and Company

12
Price Waterhouse
Touche Ross and Company.
The firms that compose the "Big 7" group are as follows:
Alexander Grant and Company
Hurdman and Cranstoun
J. K. Lasser and Company
Laventhol and Horwath
S. D. Leidesdorf and Company
Main Lafrentz and Company
Seidman and Seidman.
The questionnaire was mailed March 10, 1978.
questionnaire was mailed April 24, 1978.

A follow-up

All useable

responses received on or before May 24, 1978, were included
in the results which were tabulated by the researcher.

The

total responses were 10; the response rate was 66.67%.

The

results of both questionnaires are presented in Chapter 4.
Preview to This Study
In Chapter 2 the various advantages of a policy of
rotating auditors are discussed.

The disadvantages of a

policy of rotating auditors are discussed in Chapter 3.

A

questionnaire exploring the selection, rotation and reten
tion of independent auditors was submitted to both indus
trial firms and CPA firms.

The results of these question

naires are presented in Chapter 4.
remarks are presented in Chapter 5.

Summary and concluding
Appendix A contains

the questionnaires and transmittal letters.

Appendix B

contains the list of the Fortune 500 companies to which
the questionnaire for the controllers was sent.

Chapter 2
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE ROTATION
OF AUDITORS
When considering a policy such as rotation of audi
tors, it is necessary to understand, discuss, and question
the advantages and disadvantages of such a policy.

In

this chapter, the advantages of rotation of auditors will
be explored.

What exactly would be considered thebenefits

of a policy of rotation of auditors?
The advantages of a policy of rotation of auditors
are as follows:
1.

Maintenance of independence,

2.

Presenting the client with a

fresh point of

view, and
3.

Possibly reducing litigation against account
ants .

Each of these advantages is discussed in this chapter.
Maintaining Independente
The first and most often discussed advantage of
rotating auditors is the maintenance of independence.

Not

only the maintaining of independence, but the strengthening
of independence is viewed as a primary benefit of rotation

14
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of auditors.

Why is this so?

Why is independence so im

portant?
Independence is considered to be the cornerstrone
of the accounting profession.

The reason is that people,

that is, third parties, look to accountants to issue
opinions that are fair and unbiased with regard to the
financial statements of a company.

Accountants, specific

ally auditors, cannot do that unless they are independent.
What Does It Mean to be Independent?
Webster's Dictionary defines independence as "the
quality or state of being independent" and independence as
"not subject to control by others; self-governing."^

How

do others view independence?
Independence as Viewed by the AICPA
The American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants has issued a Code of Professional Ethics which guides
certified public accountants in their professional conduct.
The Code of Professional Ethics helps accountants to govern
themselves.

The AICPA has an Auditing Standards Executive

Committee which issues Statements on Auditing Standards.
These auditing standards are adhered to by certified public
accountants.

The AICPA1s primary set of standards are known

Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary
(Springfield, Mass:
G. and C. Merriam Co., 1963), p. 426.
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as generally accepted auditing standards and are composed
of general standards, standards of field work and stand
ards of reporting.

Of the general standards, the second

one is perhaps the most important.

It is as follows:

In all matters relating to the assignment,
an independence in mental attitude is to be main
tained by the auditor or auditors.2
The AICPA does on to describe what is meant by this general
standard on independence.
This standard requires that the auditor be
independent, aside from being in public practice
(as distinct from being in private practice), he
must be without bias with respect to the client
under audit, since otherwise he would lack that
impartiality necessary for the dependability of
his findings, however excellent his technical
proficiency may be. However, independence does
not imply the attitude of a prosecutor but rather
a judicial impartiality that recognizes an obliga
tion for fairness not only to management and owners
of a business but also to creditors and those who
may otherwise rely (in part, at least) upon the
independent auditor's report, as in the case of
prospective owners or creditors.^
The discussion of this standard continues by emphasizing the
need for the public to remain confident in the auditor's
independence.

The profession's code of ethics contains

precepts which guard against any assumption of the loss of
independence by an auditor.

Basically, the AICPA views in

dependence in the following manner:

2

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Statement on Auditing Standards:
Codification of Auditing
Standards and Procedures (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1973), p. 5.
^Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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To be independent, the auditor must be in
tellectually honest; to be recognized as inde
pendent, he must be free from any obligation
to or interest in the client, its management,
or its owners. . . . Independent auditors
should not only be independent in fact; they
should avoid situations that may lead outsiders
to doubt their independence.4
Having reviewed the AICPA standard regarding inde
pendence, it is useful to look at other meanings and inter
pretations of independence as it relates to accountants in
order to understand more fully why accountants place so
much importance on this one facet of professional conduct.
Independence as Viewed by Third Parties
It is interesting to take an historical look at how
the public--that is, third parties— have perceived account
ants and independence over the years.

Third parties are

defined, for the purposes of this discussion, as those
people who are "providing or using relevant, timely and
verifiable information which is free from bias, but who are
not acting as spokesman for the AICPA or the Securities and
Exchange Commission."

5

The viewpoint of third parties can be segmented into
three periods of time.
time period.

The first era is the pre-World War I

During this period, detection of fruad was the

primary purpose of the nineteenth century auditor.

^Ibid.
5
Robert E. Schlosser, "An Historical Approach to
the Concept of Independence," The New York Certified Public
Accountant, Vol. 39 (July, 1969), p. 522.
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Independence was conceived as denoting "disinterestedness"
or "outsiderness."
detect fraud.

This was all that was necessary to

In the early 1900's, the idea of independ

ence in fact began to develop.

If an auditor was inde-

pendent, it was necessary for him to have integrity,
honesty, and freedom to express his opinion when certify
ing a company's financial statements.

Without the integ

rity and honesty, the presence of independence meant
nothing to third parties.^
The second era of the public viewpoint of independ
ence is marked by the years from World War I to the Depres
sion.

During this era the idea of independence meaning

integrity and honesty grew.

Detection of fraud was still

considered the main purpose of an audit.

However, in the

early 1930's, an article in the Journal of Accountancy
talked about the fact that since railroads were audited by
the Interstate Commerce Commission, it was not usual for
them to use independent audits.

However, the underlying

idea expressed in the article was that an auditor's inde
pendence guaranteed honesty and integrity which was needed
to make audits of value and full compliance was supported.
Independence is now developed to mean having integrity and
7
honesty, not only "disinterestedness."

^Ibid., pp. 522-523.
7Ibid.
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The third era takes up the period of the Post
Depression years.

There were two significant developments

which occurred in the early 1930's.

First, the Securities

Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 stated re
quirements for independent auditors.

Second, the New York

Stock Exchange called for independent audits of all com
panies listed on the exchange.
pressures on public accountants.

These two events put new
They now had to compose

generally accepted accounting principles to which the New
York Stock Exchange companies should conform.

Here the con

cept of independence for an auditor takes on the aspect of
someone who can objectively apply accounting principles as
8

*

well as detect fraud.
With the formulation of the generally accepted
accounting principles, the auditor now is responsible for
passing judgment on the application of principles to a
company's statements.

This can be called the "objective

judgment" criteria of independence.

Independence now means

having the ability and willingness to be objective in
passing judgment on the satisfactory application of gener
ally accepted accounting principles, besides being honest
and having integrity.

The "objective judgment" criteria of

independence which developed during the Post Depression

O

Ibid., p. 524.
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years is very close to the concept of independence as a
g
"state of mind" which is widely held today.
Independence as Viewed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission
Regulation S-X of the Securities and Exchange Com
mission Accounting Rules is the principal accounting regu
lation.

Within this regulation Rule 2.01 sets forth the

Securities and Exchange Commission's formal requirements
as to the qualifications of accountants and their independ
ence.

Rule 2.01 is as follows:

(a) The Commission will not recognize any per
son as a certified public accountant who is not
duly registered and in good standing as such under
the laws of the place of his residence or princi
pal office.
The Commission will not recognize any
person as a public accountant who is not in good
standing and entitled to practice as such under
the laws of the place of his residence or princi
pal office.
(b) The Commission will not recognize any cer
tified public accountant or public accountant as
independent who is not in fact independent.
For
example, an accountant will be considered not in
dependent with respect to any person or any of its
parents, its subsidiaries, or other affiliates
(1) in which, during the period of his professional
engagement to examine the financial statements
being reported on or at the date of his report, he
or his firm or a member thereof had, or was com
mitted to acquire, any direct financial interest
or any material indirect financial interest; (2)
with which, during the period of his professional
engagement to examine the financial statements
being reported on, at the date of his report or
during the period covered by the financial state
ments, he or his firm or a member thereof was

9Ibid.
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connected as a promoter, underwriter, voting
trustee, director, officer, or employee, ex
cept that a firm will not be deemed not inde
pendent in regard to a particular person if a
former officer or employee of such person is
employed by the firm and such individual has
completely disassociated himself from the per
son and its affiliates and does not partici
pate in auditing financial statements of the
person or its affiliates covering any period
of his employment by the person.
For the pur
poses of the rule the term "member" means all
partners in the firm and all professional
employees participating in the audit or located
in an office of the firm participating in a
significant portion of the audit.
(c)
In determining whether an accountant
may in fact be not independent with respect to
a particular person, the Commission will give
appropriate consideration to all relevant cir
cumstances, including evidence bearing on all
relationships between the accountant and that
person or any affiliate thereof, and will not
confine itself to the relationship existing in
connection with the filing of reports with the
Commission.10
Over the years, beginning in 1937, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has published advisories known as
Accounting Series Releases.

These statements deal with a

variety of subjects which relate to the accounting regula
tions of the SEC.

Several of these releases have dealt

specifically with independence.
1.

ASR 2.

They are as follows:’

Independence of Accountants:

tionship to Registrant.

Rela

Released May 6, 1937.

This release stated the position of the Com
mission that "an accountant could not be

York:

~^SEC Accounting Rules, Topical Law Reports (New
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1968), pp. 125-126.

22
deemed independent if he is, or has been dur
ing the period under review, an officer or
director of the registrant or if he holds an
interest in the registrant that is significant
with respect to its total capital or his own
personal fortune."^
2.

ASR 22.

Independence of Accountants:

fication by Registrant.
1941.

Indemni

Released March 14,

This release stated that if the account

ant and the registrant enter into an agreement
to indemnify the accountant against all losses
arising out of the certification of the state
ments, other than as a result of the account
ant's willful misstatement or omission, then the
accountant cannot be recognized as independ, 12

ent.
3.

ASR 37.
S-X:

Amendment of Rule 2.01 of Regulation

Qualifications of Accountants Certifying

to Financial Statements Required to be Filed
with the Commission.

Released November 7, 1942.

This release talked about disclosure of trans
actions.

It stated the following:

"Perhaps

the most critical test of the actuality of an

~^Ibid., p. 3023.
^ Ibid. , p. 3049.
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accountant's independence is the strength of
his insistence upon full disclosure of trans
actions between the company and members of its
management as individuals; accession to the
wishes of the management in such cases must
inevitably raise a serious question as to whether the accountant is in fact independent."
4.

ASR 44.

13

Amendments to Rule 2.01 of Regulation

S-X Regarding Qualifications of Accountants
Certifying to Financial Statements Required to
be Filed with the Commssion.
1943.

Released May 24,

This release stated that the Commission

is interested in relationships between a
registrant and a certifying accountant only to
the extent that a particular relationship might
be relevant in determining whether the accountant is m
5.

ASR 47.

fact independent.

14

Independence of Certifying Accountants:

Summary of Past Releases of the Commission and
a Compilation of Hitherto Unpublished Cases or
Inquiries Arising Under Several of the Acts
Administered by the Commission.
ary 25, 1944.

13Ibid., p. 3076.
14

Ibid., p. 3082.

Released Janu

This release outlined twenty
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representative examples of cases where an
accountant was considered by the Commission
not to be independent in regard to a particu
lar company.

The examples discussed cover

situations in which there were financial in
vestments and transactions between the company
and the accountant, where the accountant
served as an officer of the company, where
the accountant was related to the management
of the company, and where the accountant.drew
up the monthly records of the company.
6.

ASR 81.
ants:

15

Independence of Certifying Account
Compilation of Representative Adminis

trative Rulings in Cases Involving the Inde
pendence of Accountants.
1958.

Released December 11,

This release enumerates twenty-six

situations in which an accountant was held not
to be independent.

It also discusses twenty

cases where an accountant was still considered
independent.

The release also deals with ten

examples of situations where inquiries might
be made into the matter of an accountant's
independence.^

15Ibid., pp. 3085-3089.
16Ibid., pp. 3236-3244.

25
7.

ASR 126.

Independence of Accountants:

Guide

lines and Examples of Situations Involving the
Independence of Accountants.
1972.

Released July 5,

This release further sets forth the

present guidelines by which the Commission
determines questions concerning independence.
The Commission states that "the concept of in
dependence is more easily defined than
applied."

17

The guidelines are therefore de

signed to acquaint accountants with typical
situations where there has been a loss of in
dependence in appearance or in fact.

This

serves to point out to the accountant areas of
potential danger to his independence.
In general, the reasoning behind any
rule on independence is that the client, not
the accountant, is responsible for managerial
and decision-making functions.

If the account

ant becomes involved in these functions, then
a relationship might develop, or appear to
develop, which would prejudice an accountant's
professional judgment.

On the other hand, an

accountant's job is to advise management and
give advice on problems.

^Ibid. , p. 3363.

At what point does
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advising end and managerial responsibility be
gin?

The SEC resolves this dilemma by setting

forth this guidelines as follows:
In this context, managerial responsi
bility begins when the accountant
becomes, or appears to become, so
identified
ith the client's manage
ment as t.
- indistinguished from
it.
In maivrng a determination of
whether this degree of identifica
tion has been reached, the basic con
sideration is whether, to a third
party, the client appears to be
totally dependent upon the account
ant's skill and judgment in its finan
cial operations or to be reliant only
to the extent of the customary type
of consultation or advice.18
In line with this policy, the Commission sets
out in this release several areas where it
feels that the accountant's independence will
be questioned.

They are as follows:

a) EDP and Booking Services.

The SEC feels that

an accountant cannot objectively perform an
audit on books and records which he has
kept for the client because the situation
becomes one of the accountant evaluating and
attesting to his own record keeping.
b) Financial Interest.

There can be no finan

cial interest involved between a client and

18

Ibid., p. 3364.
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an accountant, his wife or someone under the
accountant's supervision.

Even if the

financial is considered indirect, a test is
made to determine if such interest is
material by relating the amount involved to
the net worth of the accountant, his firm,
and the net worth of the client.
c) Family Relationships.

The Commission looks

here at the strength of the family bond
that exists between an accountant and the
client.

A family relationship may cause

outside parties to question any examination
made by the accountant.
d) Business Relationships with Clients.

Any

business relationship other than as a con
sumer will give the accountant a problem of
the loss of appearance of objectivity and
impartiality in the performance of the audit.
Such relationships appear to cause a conflict
of interests.
e) Occupations with Conflicting Interests.

The

accountant, as an auditor, must appear to
be completely objective.

If he engages in

other activities and relationships as an
attorney, as a broker-dealer, or as a direct
competitor in a commercial enterprise with
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his client, then the accountant jeopardizes
his objectivity and independence as an audi
tor.19
The Securities and Exchange Commission places a
great deal of emphasis on an accountant's independence.
Although it is hard to define independence because it is an
intangible, it is necessary to approach the concept through
a practical course.

The SEC does this by observing an

accountant's behavior and inferring that his behavior is
an indication of his thoughts about independence.

There

fore, the SEC, in reviewing cases where an accountant's in
dependence has been questioned, looks at all relevant cir
cumstances— an accountant's relationships which would influ
ence his actions as well as the actions themselves.

The

SEC has the difficult task of enforcing rules and regula
tions which seek to set guides for an intangible concept—
independence.^ 9
An Operational Concept of Independence
The concept of independence is a difficult one to
grasp, because independence is intangible.
readily be seen by everyone.

Consequently, there has been

much discussion about independence.

19
20

It cannot

Accountants must be

Ibid., pp. 3365-3372.

Schlosser, "An Historical Approach to the Concept
of Independence," p. 521.
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concerned with independence because it is a quality which
is so essential to the accounting profession.

How, then,

can persons concerned with the independence of accountants
reach a common understanding of the term?
One approach to determining what independence is
is to look at independence in terms of an operational con
cept.

Dr. Hussein A. Sharaf and Dr. R. K. Mautz have de

veloped an operational concept of independence in order to
help the auditor to evaluate his independence.

This opera

tional concept focuses on the operational relationship
between the auditor and the client.

One phase of such a

relationship is that the client's influence or control may
be so subtle that the auditor may not be aware of its un
less he is constantly alert to such a possibility.

In addi

tion, in the auditor's desire to serve the client, the
client may influence the auditor more than he should.

These

possibilities increase the need for a clear concept of in
dependence .^
Independence in a client-auditor relationship can
be affected by economic pressure, social obligation or per
sonal relationships.

The concept of independence is com

plex and should be subdivided into at least three parts in
order to understand more fully the ways in which independence

21

Hussein 'A. Sharaf and R. K. Mautz, "An Opera
tional Concept of Independence," The Journal of Accountancy,
Vol. 109 (April, 1960), pp. 51-52.
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can be destroyed.

The three dimensions of independence are

programming independence, investigative independence, and
reporting independence.

These dimensions are defined in

the following manner:
1.

Programming independence: Freedom from con
trol or undue influence in the selection of
audit technique and procedures and in the
extent of their application.
This requires
that the auditor have freedom to develop his
own program, both as to steps to be included
and the amount of work to be performed, with
in the overall bounds of the engagement.

2.

Investigative independence: Freedom from con
trol and undue influence in the selection of
areas, activities, personal relationships and
managerial policies to be examined.
This re
quires that no legitimate source of informa
tion be closed to the auditor.

3.

Reporting independence:
Freedom from control
or undue influence in the statement of facts
revealed by the examination or in the expres
sion of recommendations or opinions as a re
sult of the examination.
The relationship of
reporting to the examination has been neatly
expressed in the following:
"You tell us what
to do and we'll tell you what we can write in
our report; you tell us what you want us to
say in our report, and we'll tell you what we
have to do."22
Having segmented the concept of independence into

three parts, there are guidelines which can be utilized by
the auditor to guard against both the obvious and subtle
influence on his independence.

These guidelines as pro

posed under the approach of an operational concept of in
dependence are as follows:

22

Ibid.

31
Programming Independence
1. Freedom from managerial interference or fric
tion intended to eliminate, specify, or modify
any portion of the audit.
2. Freedom from interference with or an unco
operative attitude respecting the application
of selected procedures.
3. Freedom from any outside attempts to subject
the audit work to review other than that pro
vided for in the audit process.
Investigative Independence
1. Direct and free access to all company books,
records, officers and employees and other
sources of information with respect to busi
ness activities, obligations, and resources.
2. Active cooperation from managerial personnel
during the course of the auditor's examination.
3. Freedom from any managerial attempt to assign
or specify the activities to be examined or to
establish the acceptability of evidential mat
ter.
4. Freedom from personal interests or relation
ships leading to exclusion from or limitation
of the examination of any activity, record or
person that otherwise would have been included
in the audit.
Reporting Independence
1. Freedom from any feeling of loyalty or obliga
tion to modify the impact of reported facts
on any party.
2. Avoidance of the practice of excluding sig
nificant matters from the formal report in
favor of their inclusion in an informal re
port of any kind.
3. Avoidance of intentional or unintentional use
of ambiguous language ih the statement of facts,
opinions, and recommendations and in their in
terpretation .
4. Freedom from any attempt to overrule the audi
tor 's judgment as to appropriate content of the
audit report, either factual matter or his
opinion.23

23

Ibid., p. 53.
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In order to make full use of the above detailed
guidelines, it is necessary for the auditor to examine his
activities and working situations in a very direct, un
biased and straightforward manner.

If the auditor is able

to do this, he can better determine his degree of inde
pendence and take corrective action, if need be, to insure
that his independence is maintained.
A Behavioral Model of Independence
When an auditor becomes engaged by a client, he is
attempting to make an examination of the company's activi
ties in order to form an opinion and render this opinion
in a written report.

This report is of interest to manage

ment, shareholders of the firm and thi.rd parties, that is,
potential investors, creditors and suppliers.

The rela

tionship between the auditor and these three groups can
cause pressures which may affect an auditor's independence.
In order to understand the problems associated with
an auditor's independence, it is helpful to look at the
power that the firm and the auditor possess.

The firm's

source of power comes from the fact that the firm can
choose an auditor from a large group of other auditors, can
decide the conditions of employment, and can terminate such
employment if desired.

In addition, the management supplies

the auditor with the facilities and information to do the
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job.

If management wishes to change the auditor's report,

he can terminate the auditor's employment.

24

The auditor's source of power comes from the type
of services he renders to the client and how these ser
vices are viewed by the client.

The higher the number of

nonroutine problems handled by the auditor, the more power
he exercises as opposed to the power of the client.

In

addition, the greater the number of services that the audi
tor performs directly for the paying client, the more im
portant these services become and consequently, the more
power the auditor has.

In viewing the auditor as compared

to other professionals, for instance lawyers or physi
cians, it becomes clear that the power weilded by an audi
tor is low.

The reason for this is that most of the prob

lems handled by an auditor are routine and the services
provided are paid for by the client but used mostly by
third parties.

These factors cause the auditor's power to

be minimal and put the auditor in a vulnerable position
with regard to client pressures.

25

The auditor's conduct is guided by a code of ethics
and standards.

When the code of ethics is enforced, an

auditor's power is increased.
24

The auditor, however, must

Arieh Goldman and Benzion Barley, "The AuditorFirm Conflict of Interests:
Its Implications for Inde
pendence," The Accounting Review, Vol. 49 (October, 1974),
p. 707.
25Ibid., pp. 710-711.
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constantly be alert to pressures and strive to maintain his
independence.

The ability of the auditor to withstand pres

sures is dependent upon the balance of power between the
auditor and the firm.

This is illustrated in the diagram

of a behavioral model of independence shown on the follow
ing page.

The way an auditor behaves in a professional

relationship is a result of many pressures.

This behavior

will affect the auditor's professional standing and will
reflect on his- independence.
Aspects of Independence
Independence— A State of Mind
Independence is necessary in the practice of all
professions and more especially, accounting.

It is most

important to understand that independence at its core is a
state of mind.

If a professional accountant is not con

vinced in his own mind of his independence, then there is
need for some soulsearching.

Independence cannot be de

fined accurately because it is a condition of the mind and
character.

Independence is a matter of professional integ

rity, where integrity refers to the sense of uprightness of
character, probity and honesty.

27

27

J. L. Carey and W. 0. Doherty, "The Concept of
Independence:
Review and Restatement," The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. 121 (January, 1966), p. 39.

Diagram 1.

A Behavioral Model of Independence

Independent
Variables

Intervening
Variable

Firm1s source of power:
i) Ability to hire and
fire auditor
ii) Ability to determine
auditor's fees
iii) Ability to determine
work conditions

Amount of
firm's power
J

x

Auditor's source of power:
i) Nature of the problem
solved (routine, non
routine)
/
Beneficiaries
from
>
Amount
of
ii)
auditor1s power
the services (firm,
third parties)
State of professional
iii)
ethics

Source:

Dependent
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Ik
^ A u d i t o r 's
ability to
withstand
pressure
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^
^

Behavior
according to
professional
standards

Arieh Goldman and Benzion Bariev, "The Auditor-Firm Conflict
of Interests:
Its Implications for Independence," The
Accounting Review, Vol. 49 (October, 1974), p. 712.
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While independence is essentially a state of mind,
this concept can be explored in terms of three phases of
independence as follows:

professional independence, audit

independence, and perceived independence.
Professional independence refers to that which the
auditor must achieve.

He must have a nonsubordinate, con

fident approach and attitude towards his client.

The audi

tor must be free from management's control and influence
in making decisions.

He must use as a basis for decisions

his own professional expertise.

28

Audit independence is the second phase of independ
ence.

This type of independence can be summarized as fol

lows :
It is most important that the CPA not only shall
refuse to subordinate his judgment to that of
others but that he be independent of any selfinterest which might warp his judgment even sub
consciously in reporting whether or not the
financial position and net income are fairly
presented.
Independence in this context means
objectivity or lack of bias in forming delicate
judgments.29
This lack of bias may be viewed on two levels.

One level

can be called the "objective audit independence."

Objec

tive audit independence refers to the auditor avoiding any
28

D. R. Carmichael and R. J. Swieringa, "Compati
bility of Auditing Independence and Management Services—
An Identification of Issues," The Accounting Review, Vol.
43 (October, 1968), p. 698.
29

John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Certified
Public Accountants (New York: American Institute of
Accountants, 1956), p. 21.
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intentional favoring of a client's interests in planning
the examination, gathering evidence, or preparing the audit
report.

If an auditor would consciously use ambiguous

wording in his report or put important matters in an in
formal report rather than the formal report, then he would
lack objective audit independence.

The second level of a

lack of bias in audit independence is known as "subjective
audit independence."

Subjective audit independence refers

to an auditor avoiding unintentional feelings which favor
a client's interests when the auditor performs his work.
For example, an auditor who is basically honest can lack
subjective audit independence due to a limited ability for
examination.

However, an auditor who does not have objec-

tive audit independence does not have basic integrity.

30

Perceived independence is the third phase of inde
pendence.

It refers to how an accountant's independence

appears to the public.

There are two facets of perceived

independence which need to be examined.

On one hand, it is

important for a reasonable, knowledgeable person to per
ceive an individual practitioner as independent.
emphasis is on a one to one basis.

The

Another level of per

ceived independence is the general public's perception of
the whole accounting profession.

This level of perceived

■^Carmichael and Swieringa,

0 £.

cit., p. 698.
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independence has to do with a professional image.

Individ

ual accountants as well as the profession as a whole should
be perceived as being independent. 31
It is by looking at independence in appearance and
independence in reality that the importance of maintaining
independence in the accounting profession strongly comes
forth.
Independence— Appearance and Reality
An accountant may feel that he is independent when
he examines his own state of mind.

He may feel that he has

a high degree of professional integrity and will do all he
can to carry out his assignment honestly and objectively.
However, the accountant must also be concerned with the
appearance of independence.
A former chairman of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants' Committee on Professional Ethics
pinpointed this problem as follows:
There are actually two kinds of independence
which a CPA must have— independence in fact and
independence in appearance. The former refers
to a CPA's objectivity, to the quality of not be
ing influenced by regard to personal advantage.
The latter means his freedom from potential con
flicts of interest which might tend to shake
public confidence in his independence in fact.

~^Ibid. , p . 699.
32

Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics: A Time
for Reappraisal," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 113
(March, 1962), p. 31.
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An accountant must know that he is independent.
also consider how he seems to others.

He must

It is impossible for

anyone to know exactly how something seems to any person or
group.

Consequently, the rule of reason must be used.
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The following questions could serve as a guideline
for determining whether an auditor's independence has been
encrouched upon in any way:
1.

2.
3.

Will a specific relationship really tempt
an auditor to subordinate ,his professional
judgment, despite all sanctions to the
contrary?
Would it seem to reasonable observers to
be likely to do so?
How would it affect the public interest?
Who is likely to be hurt.34

The auditor, in dealing with the problems of inde
pendence in reality and independence in appearance, must
remember that auditors have to be concerned with how third
parties do in fact view the profession— not how the auditors think third parties ought to view the profession. 35
Having reviewed the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants' ethical standard of independence, the
Securities and Exchange Commission's viewpoint on independ
ence and several other approaches and issues involved in

33

Carey and Doherty, "The Concept of Independence:
Review and Restatement," p. 39.
34
35

.
Ibid., p. 42.

Eugene G. Taper, "Independence— Our Public Image,"
The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 126 (August, 1968), p. 67.
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understanding the issue of independence, it is useful to
summarize the accounting profession's view of independence.
In general, the following five statements apply to
accountants:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

We have to be independent.
We have to appear to be independent.
Independence can't be precisely defined
because it is a state of mind.
We can't be independent if we have a
financial interest.
We can't be independent if we are asso
ciated too closely with management.36

It is this last statement which gives rise to the
following question:

How can CPA firms who have maintained

client relations with one client over a period of years
still consider themselves to be independent?

Is it not

possible that client pressures and influences have built
up, perhaps subtly, over the years so as to negate a CPA's
independence in fact as well as independence in appear
ance?
Since independence is so important to the account
ing profession, it would appear to be useful to consider any
way in which this cornerstone of professionalism could be
maintained and strengthened.

A possible answer to the

problem of maintaining and strengthening independence with
in the profession is the rotation of auditors.

By rotation

of auditors, it is meant a compulsory rotation of account
ing firms among clients every three to five years.

36Ibid., p. 65.

By having
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CPA firms rotate from one client to another every few years,
long associations with their potential buildup of pressures
and influences are avoided.

The auditor's state of mind is

truly independent because he knows that his work will be
reviewed by other accountants from other firms that will
follow.

The auditor's sense of professional integrity is

heightened because he knows there is nothing to gain by
letting his work be influenced by management pressures.

In

addition, a CPA's independence in fact and in appearance is
strengthened.

This is something with which the auditor

must continually be concerned.
The rotation of auditors is a possible answer to
the problem of maintaining independence within the account
ing profession.

Likewise, the maintaining of independence

is set forth as the chief advantage of adopting a policy of
rotation of auditors.
A Fresh Point of View
A second advantage often cited by those who advo
cate a policy of rotation of auditors is that such a policy
offers the client a fresh point of view.

A firm which has

a long, close association with a client may tend to
approach the work for the client in a casual manner.

A

certain laxness in the auditor's approach might result after
a period of years.
37
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Robert K. Mautz, "Rotation of Auditors," Finan
cial Executive, Vol. 42 (July, 1974), p. 53.
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Rotation of auditors can bring in new auditors who
have a fresh point of view and possibly a different
approach to the existing accounting operation.

With this

fresh point of view, a new auditor may discover problems
which the previous auditor failed to notice.

The new

accounting firm which is hired to replace an old firm
brings with it new blood.

This causes everyone connected

with the audit to be more alert.

38

The present firm of

auditors will generally perform an audit of higher quality
because they know that another firm will be reviewing their
work at a later date.
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Rotation of auditors is practiced by some of the
large CPA firms in assigning auditing staffs to clients.
Every year or two the members of an auditing team are
rotated so that the same people do not audit the same cli
ent year after year.

The same firm audits the client, but

not the same people.
Although this type of rotation is better than no
rotation at all, it does not go far enough.

Even though

the audit team members are rotated, the work is still over
seen and reviewed by the same audit manager.

Therefore

his viewpoint and approach to the client's problems are the

38
N. Loyall McLaren, "Rotation of Auditors," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 106 (July, 1958), p. 42.
39

Alan J. Winters, "Looking at the Auditor Rotation
Issue," Management Accounting, Vol. 57 (March, 1976),
p . 30.

43
same year after year.

Another problem is that a staff

auditor may have a certain expertise in a given area and
cannot be rotated away from a particular client because
there is no one else qualified to replace him.

This means

that the same person audits the same client year after
year.
It is difficult to be completely objective when
reviewing your own work.

An audit staff which comes in to

review work done in the past by the same firm already has
a bias that the work is correct and presented in the best
manner possible simply because their firm did the work.
The overall philosophy and viewpoint of the auditing firm
is still exercised year after year even though the rota
tion of auditing staff members is practiced.
The rendering of an audit opinion by a newly en
gaged firm of certified public accountants offers a new,
fresh, and completely objective analysis of a client's
financial position and his accounting procedures.

A policy

of rotation of auditors is a means of securing such
opinions.

Rotation of auditors supplies the client with

another professional opinion and a fresh insight into his
business operations.

Previously undetected problem areas

may come to light, as well as new methods or systems for
handling the operations of the client's business.
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Reducing Litigation Against Accountants
A third advantage of a policy of rotation of audi
tors is the possible reduction of litigation against
accountants.

In today's environment where numerous cases

against accountants are being tried in the courts, this is
an important advantage to examine and consider.
In the past ten years, the cases involving account
ants have grown in number.

Persons who suffer financial

losses in dealing with companies are turning more and more
to accountants as a possible source from which to obtain
some reparation.

The accounting profession as a whole

seems to have developed into a perfect object against
which to bring any malpractice claim based on allegedly
faulty audits which arise supposedly as a result of over
sights, improper accounting practices or accounting methods
which were negligently carried o u t . ^
How Does Litigation Affect the
Accounting Profession?
In answering this question, it is helpful to review
some of the more prominent cases involving accountants.

By

doing so, the results of these cases will shed some light
on the effect of litigation on the accounting profession.
In addition, in order to understand the legal basis for

40

Arnold Levine and E. Stanley Marks, "Accountants'
Liability Insurance— Perils and Pitfalls," The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. 142 (October, 1976), p. 59.
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some of the cases brought against accountants, it is neces
sary to examine the fundamental security acts set forth by
the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930's.
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche
(January 1931)
The Ultramares Corporation v. Touche case involved
an action brought by a company, who dealt with Fred Stern
and Company, against the public accounting firm of Touche,
Niven and Company.

Fred Stern and Company was in the busi

ness of importing and selling rubber.

The plaintiff com

pany did business with Fred Stern and Company chiefly as a
factor.

Touche, Niven and Company audited the statements

of Fred Stern and Company and expressed a clean opinion on
them.

The plaintiff company relied on the statements in

making substantial loans to Fred Stern and Company.

Nearly

a year later, Fred Stern and Company declared bankruptcy.
The plaintiff company action was brought against Touche,
Niven and Company to recover the losses which it sustained
from the loans, which were made based on a misrepresenta
tion of the accountants.

The action was for negligence and

■p

^
41
fraud.

The court concluded that there was no proof of fraud
and therefore no liability against the accountants.

As to

Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 17 0
(November 18, 1930 to February 19, 1931), pp. 175-176.
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the question of negligence, Judge Cardozo had this to
say:
If liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover
of deceptive entries, may expose account
ants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an in
determinate class.
The hazards of a busi
ness conducted on these terms are so extreme
as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not
exist in the implication of a duty that ex
poses to these consequences.42
The court felt that it would be against public policy to
subject accountants to a completely open-ended liability
which would be based on the certification of the financial
statements.

If, however, an accountant's work was proved

to be fraudulent or grossly negligent, he would be held
liable to a larger group of persons, rather than just to
the client or a person who was'known to be a key user of
the information.42
A plaintiff, as a result of this case, had the bur
den of establishing certain elements in any action brought
against accountants.

He would have to prove that he was

adversely affected by relying on the financial statements
and gather enough evidence to prove that the accountant was
grossly negligent when he conducted his audit.

Finally, a

42Ibid., pp. 179-180.
43nenry B. Reiling and Russell A. Taussig, "Recent
Liability Cases— Implications for Accountants," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 130 (September, 1970), p. 40.
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plaintiff would have to prove that he was a member of the
group of possible foreseen plaintiffs that might bring an
action against the accountant.
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Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934
After the Ultramares case, in March of 1932, the
United States Senate authorized an investigation into the
practices of stock issuers and brokers.

As a result of the

report to the House of Representatives, Congress wanted
regulation of securities.

The legislation which was pro

duced was the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The Securities and Exchange Commis

sion was formed under the authority of the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934 to carry out the laws under the two
acts.
The objective of the Securities and Exchange Com
mission and the acts was to make certain that investors
were provided with complete disclosure of important facts
regarding publicly offered securities.

The Securities Act

of 1933 had the primary purpose of regulating the initial
offering and selling of any securities that utilize the
mail to make offers or to distribute stock.

This regula

tion is accomplished mainly through the requirement that

^ Michael Kennedy, "Accountants' Liability Over
view," Pennsylvania C.P.A. Spokesman, Vol. 46 (November,
1975), p. 5.
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any company offering securities must file a registration
statement and a prospectus containing financial information
most of which has been certified by an independent account. 45
ant.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides
any person, who has bought a security for which a registra
tion statement has been filed, with a federal right of
action if the registration statement contains misleading
statements or information or if it fails to include in
formation which would make the registration statement mis
leading.

This section of the Act caused two changes to

occur as regards the civil cases brought against account
ants.

First, this section significantly enlarged the group

of potential plaintiffs who could sue accountants than had
previously been the case.

Second, the burden of proof

rested less with the plaintiff and more with the account
ant.

Basically, if a plaintiff could prove that the in

formation in the registration statement was misleading,
then the company involved had no possible defense.

Conse

quently, the accountant was open to liability to third
parties unless he could substantiate a defense of "due diligence."

46

"Due diligence" is defined in Section 11(b) of

the Securities Act of 1933 as follows:
45

K. Fred Skousen, An Introduction to the S.E.C.
(Cincinnati:
South-Western Publishing Company, 1976),
p. 19.
^Kennedy, op. cit. , p. 6.
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. . . no person, other than the issuer, shall
be liable . . . who shall sustain the burden of
proof . . . (3) that (A) as regards any part of
the registration statement not purporting to be
made on the authority of any expert . . . he had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time
such part of the registration statement became
effective, that the statements therein were true
and that there was no omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein not misleading;
. . . and (C) as regards any part of the registra
tion statement purporting to be made on the
authority of an expert (other than himself) . . .
he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not
believe, at the time such part of the registration
statement became effective, that the statements
therein were untrue or that there was an omission
to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading. . . .47
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 basically ex
tended the regulation of securities beyond the initial
offering and distribution.

This Act embodies all of the

necessary authority to regulate the buying and selling of
securities on national exchanges.

With the extension of

the laws to cover not only the initial offering of securi
ties, but also the continuous buying and selling of securi
ties, the accountant was further plagued with the possibil
ity of federal actions brought in connection with continuous buying and selling transactions.

47

48

Securities Act of 1933, Statutes at Large, Vol.
48, Ch. 38, p. 82
48

Kennedy, op. cit., p. 6.
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McKesson and Robbins, Inc.
1938)

(December

Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an action
was brought against McKesson and Robbins, Inc., based on the
supposition that the information in the registration state
ment and financial statements was false and misleading.
The statements were prepared and certified by Price, Water
house and Company.

The fraud resulted in a figure of more

than $87,000,000 in consolidated assets being reported on
the financial statements, of which approximately $19,000,000
were entirely fictitious.

In reviewing the case, the Court

addressed itself to several points, including the specific
auditing procedures employed, the degree to which generally
accepted standards were followed, and the sufficiency of
safeguards in the standards to guarantee reliable and accurate financial statements.

49

The court concluded that the statements conformed
with generally accepted procedures but that there should be
a considerable advancement made in developing auditing
procedures to verify records and documents by actual physical inspection of items involved.

50

As a result of the

case, the accounting profession established new standards
with regard to confirming accounts receivable and observing
inventories.

York:

49 SEC Accounting Rules, Topical Law Reports (New
Commerce Clearing House, Inc.), pp. 3039-3040.
50Ibid., p. 3045.
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Yale Express

(April 5, 1967)

In the Fischer v. Kletz case, better known as the
Yale Express case, the plaintiff brought action against the
accounting firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company in
connection with the financial statements of Yale Express
System, Inc., a company involved in national transporta
tion.

The action was brought against the accountants as a

result of their failure to disclose figures which were discovered to be materially false and inaccurate.

51

The original financial statements for the year 1963
were audited and certified on March 31, 1964.
the statements were issued to the stockholders.

In April
In June,

the statements were included in a Form 10-K Report which
was filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

How

ever, early in 1964, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company
was hired to perform special studies of past revenue and
expense items.

As a result of the study, Peat, Marwick,

Mitchell and Company found the figures in the 1963 annual
report to be false and misleading.

It was not until May of

1965 that the auditors disclosed these results to the
stock exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission or
the public.^
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Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F.S. 180, pp. 182-183.
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In addition to the above stated facts, although
Yale wanted to issue interim statements, Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell and Company said that the company could not use
the results of the special studies in the interim state
ments.

The figures which were used in the interim re

ports were those generated through Yale's own internal
accounting procedures.

The resulting interim statements

contained unaudited and uncertified figures, which were
shown to be false and misleading.

The charge against

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company by the plaintiffs was
that they should have disclosed the fact that the 1963
financial statement figures as well as the interim state
ment figures were false and misleading at the time such
information was discovered.

The plaintiffs' contention

was that the accountants had a duty to disclose this in
formation since they knew that the public would rely on
the audited and certified statements.

Peat, Marwick,

Mitchell and Company contended that there was no common
law or statutory basis for performing such a duty as
accountants hired by Yale Express System, Inc.

According

to the auditors, the duty to report to the public ended
when they certified the 1963 financial statements.

53

Judge Tyler issued an opinion on this case.

With

regard to the work of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company

53Ibid.
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as auditor of the financial statements, the firm was an in
dependent public accountant.
as stated by Judge Tyler,

As such, his responsibility,

"is not only to the client who

pays his fee, but also to investors, creditors and others
who may rely on the financial statements which he certi
fies.

. . . The public accountant must report fairly on the

facts as he finds them whether favorable or unfavorable to
his client.

His duty is to safeguard the public interest,

not that of his client."

54

After certifying the financial

statements, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company assumed a
new role of an accountant hired to do special studies whose
first duty was to his client rather than to the public.

As

a result of these two different roles and the discovery of
materially false and misleading information, a problem
arose.

As Judge Tyler stated.

The serious question arises as to whether or
not an obligation correlative to but conceptu
ally different from the duty to audit and to cer
tify with reasonable care and professional com
petence arose as a result of the circumstance
that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company knew
that investors were relying upon its certifica
tion of the financial statements in Yale's annual
report.55
A resolution to this question was not a point dis
cussed in Judge Tyler's opinion.

However, the Yale Express

case, in posing this unique question, lead the accounting

54Ibid., p. 184.
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profession to issue in October of 1969 Statement on Audit
ing Procedure 41 entitled "Subsequent Discovery of Facts
Existing at the Date of the Auditor's Report."

This state

ment says, in essence, that when subsequent facts are dis
covered and determined to be reliable, revised financial
statements should be issued.

In addition, disclosure

should be made to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
stock exchanges and any other persons known to be relying
on the financial statements.^
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corpora
tion (March 29, 1968)
In the BarChris case, the purchasers of convertible
debentures brought action against BarChris Construction
Corporation, the corporation underwriters and the auditors
under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.

The charge

was that the registration statement contained statements
which were considered materially false and that the statement exhibited material omissions. 57
At issue in the case was one point involving a
sale and leaseback transaction.

The courts ruled that the

profits on such a transaction should have been eliminated.

56

Statement on Auditing Procedure 41;
Subsequent
Discovery of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditor's
Report (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Inc., 1969), pp. 69-70.
57

Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation,
283 F.S. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), p. 643.
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As of the date of the statements, there was no clear-cut
rule within the accounting profession on the treatment of
sale-leaseback agreements.

However, as a result of the

court being presented with several accounting methods in
the BarChris case, the court outlined a treatment it considered proper.
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This expostulation of preferred account

ing methods by the courts can have far reaching effects on
the profession.
The BarChris case itself was the first important
case decided under Section 11 involving a major firm.

The

defendants in the BarChris case used the "due diligence"
defense as stated in Section 1 1 (b) of the Securities Act
of 1933.

The courts ruled that the new directors were

liable for statements if they did not investigate state
ments by posing questions of experts, which they did not.
As a result of this finding, directors are asking their
auditors to examine and give an expert opinion on more of
the information submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission than was previously done.

The accountants

attempted to use the "due diligence" defense in the case
by stating that when the registration statement went into
effect, they believed that the audited statements were
not misleading.

To arrive at this conclusion the account

ants had to examine the company's S-l Form for registration
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Reiling and Taussig, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
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under the Securities Act of 1933.

The failure of the

auditors lay in not properly carrying out all the steps
in the S-l program as it was written.

The court ruled

that the accountants had therefore failed to show "due
diligence."

This ruling illustrates new areas of concern

for the accounting profession.

Where there were undefined

standards of practice, the courts may very well stipulate
59
standards.
Continental Vending

(June, 1968)

In United States v. Simon, criminal action was
brought against the accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross
Bros, and Montgomery, specifically against two partners
and an audit manager.

The United States Attorney's

office for the Southern District of New York instituted
the case.
The case involved the certification of misleading
financial statements by Lybrand, Ross Bros, and Montgomery.
The misleading financial statements involved the reporting
of sizable loans by Continental Vending to an affiliate,
Valley Commercial Corporation.

The loans in fact were

loans to the president of Continental for his personal stock
market transactions.

The collateral pledged by the presi

dent for the loans through Valley Commercial Corporation

59

Ibid., pp. 4 3-44.
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was inadequate.

However, the footnote on the Continental

financial statements, to which the auditors attested, did
not disclose this information.

The court said that the

prosecution had only to prove that the accountants had
certified a financial statement which they knew to be
false.

The result of the case was that the accountants

were found guilty by a jury.

60

The importance of this case for the accounting pro
fession is that it was a criminal action rather than a
civil action involving a major accounting firm.
prior to this time, had been infrequent.

Such cases,

As a result of

this case, it is necessary for public accountants to real
ize that they are not free from legal liability simply be
cause they adhere to generally accepted auditing standards
and generally accepted auditing principles.

Such prin

ciples and standards are looked upon only as minimum requirements for the public accountant.
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Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder
(March 30, 1976)
The case of Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder involved
a charge of negligence in failing to uncover fraudulent
practices in the First Securities Company of Chicago, a

^ R e i l i n g and Taussig, "Recent Liability Cases—
Implications for Accountants," pp. 48-49.
C I

Charles Gibson, "Analysis' of Continental Vending
Machine (U. S. v. Simon)," Ohio C.P.A., Vol. 30 (Winter,
1971), p. 16.
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brokerage firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange.
Leston B. Nay, president of First Securities Company, con
vinced the plaintiffs, who were customers of First Securi
ties, to invest in escrow accounts which would give a high
rate of return.
poses.

Mr. Nay used the funds for his own pur

In 1968, when Nay committed suicide, he left a

note explaining that there were really no escrow accounts
and that First Securities Company was bankrupt, since he
owned 92% of its stock.

All of the transactions for the

funds into the escrow accounts were unrecorded and the
customers never received any receipts for their deposits
or an accounting of the balance in the escrow accounts.
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Ernst and Ernst had done the audit work for First
Securities Company from 1946 to 1967.

They had also pre

pared the annual report which was filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.

The customers brought charges

against Ernst and Ernst under Section 10 (b) of the Securi
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC Rule 10b-5.

The

charge was that Ernst and Ernst was negligent in its
application of auditing procedures since it failed to dis
cover the fraud.

The fraud was mainly executed by means of

Leston Nay's mail rule.

All mail addressed to Nay was to

be opened only by him even if he was absent from his desk
for long periods of time.

The plaintiffs charged that

^ E r n s t and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 47
L.Ed.2d 668, p. 189.

59
effective auditing would have investigated this mail rule
and disclosed the fraud.

The case brought by the customers

clearly stated that they were not charging Ernst and Ernst
with intentional fraud, but only with "inexcusable negli„6 3
gence.
Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder directly confronts
the courts with the question of what is the scope of an
accountant's liability under Rule 10b-5.

Previous to this

case, the scope of an accountant's liability had been more
subject to interpretation.

Some courts, in previous cases,

understood the rule to cover both negligent and intentional
conduct.

Other courts felt that the rule was directed only

at an intentional participation in a fraud.

64

The opinion in Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder was
significant because it narrowed an area of the account
ant's liability.

The way in which the language of Rule

10b-5 under Section 10(b) was interpreted in past cases
left accountants wide open to potential investor-plaintiffs.
Courts who felt that language such as "manipulative" and
"deceptive" in the rule applied not only to an intentional
act of fraud, but also to a negligent act, wanted the rule
and statute to protect investors from all bad practices—

63Ibid., p. 190.
J. Jay Hampson, "Accountants' Liability--The
Significance of Hochfelder," The Journal of Accountancy,
Vol. 146 (December, 1976), pp. 69-70.
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both intentional and negligent.
standard in Rule 10b-5(2).

This set up a negligence

In the Ernst and Ernst v.

Hochfelder case the Supreme Court discarded this broadened
interpretation of Rule 10b-5.

The court stated the fol

lowing :
Viewed in isolation the language of subsection
(b), and arguably that of subsection (c) , could be
read as proscribing, respectively, any type of
material misstatement or omission, and any course
of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding in
vestors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or
not.65
The result of the Hochfelder decision, as far as
the accounting profession is concerned, is that it is more
difficult to bring suit against accountants.

Under Rule

10b-5, an accountant can now be said to be liable only if,
to some degree, he had knowledge of the fraud or some par
ticipation in it.

This decision of the Supreme Court in

Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder gives hope to the accounting
profession.

It stops the public from believing that an

accountant is involved in fraud when a charge only involves
negligence.

This decision helps to emphasize what an in

vestor can expect from financial statements as opposed to
what is the auditor's duty.

66

Each of these cases discussed above points out some
area where the accountant was found to be less than

^ E r n s t and Ernst v. Hochfelder, op. cit., p. 212.
Hampson, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
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thorough in the performance of his duty as an auditor.
Each of the cases resulted in some action being taken,
either by the Securities and Exchange Commission or the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which
involved the profession.

The cases discussed are only a

sample of the number of cases involving accountants which
have been brought before the courts.
seems to grow year by year.

The number of cases

Since there is a trend of

bringing legal suits against accountants and putting
their liability to a test, a person outside of the
accounting profession might wonder at the reason for all
of the litigation which has built up over the last fifteen
years.
Why Does Litigation Against
Accountants Continue?
The increasing amount of litigation that is in
stituted against accountants has caused many to wonder
about the credibility of auditors.

In conjunction with

increased litigation, there has been a great deal of
criticism from the public and the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the press and in speeches.
Why does this situation exist?

In 1973, a group

of professional leaders met with the Board of Directors
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
to discuss the causes and solution for this situation.
After some discussion the consensus of opinion was as

62
follows:

"A gap exists between the expectations of the

users of auditor's services and what the profession believed was feasible to provide."
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This gap could be

called the "responsibility gap."
In general, criticism of accountants arises when
a business fails or a company experiences significant
losses.

It is then that charges are leveled against audi

tors who supposedly have failed to execute their duty in
one of two ways.

Either the auditor neglected to ensure

that the accounting and financial reporting and disclosure
were correct or the auditor did not do a proper job of
auditing and was therefore guilty of negligence or possibly fraud.
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In response to all of this litigation

against accountants, all types of persons have expressed
opinions on the accountant's responsibilities.

These per

sons include investors, credit grantors, spokesmen for
stock exchanges, bankers, financial analysts and prominent
businessmen, as well as auditors themselves.
The responsibility gap exists between accountants
and the public because of the failure of the public to
understand the responsibilities of the accountant as they
exist in the context of an audit performed to render an

r

Wallace E. Olson, "A Look at the Responsibility
Gap," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 139 (January, 1975),
p. 52.
68
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opinion.

Areas of misunderstanding exist with regard to

the auditor's following responsibilities:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Detection of fraud and irregularities
Judgments in appraising the application
of generally accepted accounting prin
ciples
Due care in conducting an opinion audit
Judgments where there are no established
standards
Judgments about reasonableness of the
total result of individual parts.69

These areas of misunderstanding basically boil down
to one problem between what the public believes and what is
in fact the case.

The responsibility gap, also referred to

as the expectation gap, is best summed up in the following
manner:

"The consuming public, many regulators, courts,

and lawyers believe that the auditor is a guarantor or insurer of the company's financial solvency."
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The reason

behind this is that accountants use numbers which imply
exactness and so the public views financial statements as
being accurate.

Even though assets equal liabilities plus

ownership equity, the public does not realize that the pre
cision ends at that point.

The accounting profession com

plicates the matter by using words such as "certified" in
relation to financial statements.

The result of all this

is that an expectation gap, a responsibility gap, has

®^Ibid., p. 54.
70

Carl D. Liggio, "The Expectation Gap:
The
Accountant's Legal Waterloo?" The C.P.A., Vol. 45 (July,
1975), p. 24.
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arisen between what the public expects and what an accountant can reasonably be capable of performing.

71

Until the gap is lessened, the accounting profes
sion can expect to experience moire and more lawsuits in
addition to more criticism.
What Can Accountants Do to
Protect Themselves?
In general, with the abundance of litigation as a
reality faced by the accounting profession, the best way
for an accountant to protect himself is to render to his
client his best performance.

If a suit follows, an account

ant should be firm in defending himself.

The best method

of discouraging potential plaintiffs is to defend and refute cases which are not based on any merit.
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When the accountant looks to specific guidelines
that will help him to protect himself, there come to light
several articles which have been written since 1969 about
rules for minimizing liability risks.
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These rules or

^^Ibid., p. 25.
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Victor M. Earle, III, "The Litigation Explosion,"
The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 129 (March, 1970), p. 67.
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For a comprehensive discussion of these rules,
see: Donald Stuart Bab, "The CPA's Expanding Legal Liabil
ity," The Practical Accountant, Vol. 6 (March/April, 1973),
pp. 43-50; James P. Bedingfield, "The Effect of Recent
Litigation on Audit Practice," The Journal of Accountancy,
Vol. 135 (May, 1974), pp. 55-62; Joe R. Fritzemeyer, "Seven
Rules for Minimizing the Risks of Liability," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 127 (Tune, 1969), pp. 64-65; Richard L.
Miller, Jr., "Cases on Acc-ntants 1 Liability— Some Rules of
Safe Practice," Pennsylvania CPA Spokesman, Vol. 46 (Novem-
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guidelines for accountants can be outlined and summarized
as follows:
1.

Be careful in selecting or accepting new

clients.

Avoid taking clients whom you consider to be untrust
worthy.

Even though audit standards do not include

guidelines for reviewing a potential client's reputa
tion, it is important for the accountant to use his
judgment especially in the case of a client whose
standards are not in accordance with those of most
businesses and other professionals.

This special care

is necessary to protect the accountant and also to
decrease the possibility of financial losses for per
sons investing with a potential client.
2.

Once the client has been accepted, write

up the agree

ment of the work to be done in an engagement letter.
Make the client cognizant of the fact that the certi
fied public accountant is not an insurer and explain
to him exactly what duties and responsibilities the
accountant takes upon himself.
3.

Once the terms of the engagement have been settled, be
sure that there are an adequate number of mature and
experienced persons staffing and supervising every
phase of the work.
\

ber, 1975), pp. 7-13; Norman 0. Olson, "The Auditor in
Legal Difficulty— What's the Answer?" The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. 129 (Spril, 1970), pp. 39-44.
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4.

Carry out every step listed in the engagement letter
thoroughly.

5.

Know the client's business and be aware of trouble
spots.

Take special care in these areas.

Later, if

the courts say that you as the accountant knew or
should have known about a particular problem, you can
say that you did know.
6.

It is essential to be thoroughly knowledgeable about
generally accepted auditing standards and procedures
and generally accepted accounting principles.

Do not

rely on these standards and principles totally.

The

compliance of the accountant with these guidelines is
not always a complete defense before a court of law.
The courts consider the body of professional litera
ture as a minimum test to meet against liability.

An

accountant's professional judgment rather than mere
adherence to rules is more significant before the
courts.
7.

Be thorough in writing up working papers.

Be sure

that they are complete, reviewed and retained in the
client's file.
8.

When writing footnotes and reports on audited finan
cial statements, exercise extreme care.

Be sure

everything in the report is stated clearly, not just
to fellow accountants but to laymen as well.
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9.

In going through the audit program, be sure that
every step as listed is carried out.

If any change

is made, make reference to it in writing and ex
plain the change, the reason for it, and the result
of the change in the overall program.
10.

If in performing procedures, exceptions turn up in
testing, be sure that these exceptions are examined
and eliminated in a satisfactory manner.

Be sure

that the working papers document the exceptions as
well as what was done about them.
11.

Explain exactly what work you have done and, if
appropriate, what work you have omitted.

When a

phase of the work has been conducted differently from
a standard engagement, it becomes critical that the
language in your report is clear.
12.

Consult legal counsel if you have a question about
disclosure problems.

Often the problem involved is

not so much a matter of accounting as it is a mat
ter of legal disclosure requirements.

In this case,

a lawyer may be able to supply some helpful advice.
13.

Be prompt in billing and collecting fees.

If un

paid bills are allowed to exist, a question about
the accountant's independence and objectivity may
arise in the minds of third parties.
14.

Obtain adequate insurance which will cover risks as
well as legal expenses of defending a case if the
need should ever arise.
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15.

Maintain regular direct contact with the board of
directors of the client.

The board of directors

should be made aware of any disputes which arise
between management and the accountant.

These

measures help to maintain the independence of the
accountant.
16.

Be sure of all the accounting
but go one step further.
make sense?

rules and procedures,

Ask yourself:

Does it

Does the result of the work from an

overall viewpoint make sense?

Is the result likely

to mislead a third party, i.e., "an uninformed but
reasonable man"?
With all of these rules and guidelines to follow in
order to minimize the possibility of litigation, the
accounting profession might consider yet another rule or
guideline.

The guideline that is being proposed here is

the systematic rotation of auditors.

This policy would

help to reduce the possibility of litigation.
be accomplished in the following manner.

This would

A policy of

rotation would cause the present auditors engaged by the
company to be more exact and thorough in their work since
they know that other auditing firms would be succeeding
them.

The new firms would be reviewing the previous audi

tor's methods and procedures used in performing the audit
engagement.

This pressure of a review by another auditing

firm would cause the auditors to fully examine and attempt
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to solve problem areas in the accounting system, thereby
exploring some of the potentially dangerous areas which
give rise to much of the costly litigation brought against
accountants.

In addition, the fresh point of view brought

to a job by a new auditing firm would give the client a
more objective, critical review which would also help to
ferret out problem areas which could lead to litigation.
The majority of cases brought against accountants
involve charges of negligence and/or fraud.

By rotating

the auditors, the present auditors would be more diligent
and critical in their work due to professional pressure
and would thereby reduce the possibility of litigation
brought against accountants on the basis of negligence
and/or fraud.
Summary
Over the past several years, the accounting profes
sion has come under more and more scrutiny by the public,
the courts, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The pressure has been put on the profession more and more
to render accounting services with a high degree of integ
rity and independence.

One of the ways in which this might

be accomplished is to adopt a policy of rotation of audi
tors.

The primary advantage of such a policy is the main

taining and strengthening of independence.

Another advan

tage would be the offering of a fresh point of view to
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clients.

A third advantage would be the reduction of the

ever increasing amount of litigation brought against
accountants.
vantages.

This chapter has discussed these three ad

The following chapter will present the disad

vantages of adopting a policy of rotation of auditors within
the accounting profession.

Chapter 3
THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE ROTATION
OF AUDITORS
In the process of considering a policy such as ro
tation of auditors, it is necessary to understand and dis
cuss the disadvantages of such a policy.

In the preceding

chapter the advantages were pointed out.

This chapter will

concentrate on the disadvantages.

What exactly are con

sidered the disadvantages of a policy of rotation of audi
tors?
The disadvantages of a policy of rotation of audi
tors are as follows:
1.

Loss of large clients by CPA firms,

2.

Adverse effects of installing new auditors,

3.

Experience and information loss from previous
audits, and

4.

Disruption of types of services offered to
the client.

Before discussing each of these disadvantages, it
is necessary to clarify a point concerning a policy of
rotation of auditors.

If such a policy becomes general, it

will be as a result of pressure from clients, and possibly
the Securities and Exchange Commission and/or government.
71
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This policy of rotation of auditors will be imposed on the
CPA firms; in other words, the policy may become one of
mandatory auditor rotation.
Loss of Large Clients by CPA Firms
One of the disadvantages of a policy of rotation

of

auditors is the loss of large clients by the CPA firms.
This point is never specifically mentioned in articles
which discuss the topic of rotation of auditors.

The loss

of clients by the CPA firms is a disadvantage from the
point of view of the firm that is losing the client, whe
ther the client is large or small.
A CPA firm that has donegood and conscientious
work for

a large client and that

has worked to cultivate

a long and successful relationship would view the loss of
such a client as a primary disadvantage of such a policy as
rotation of auditors.

The long years of association and

close communication would be viewed as a tremendous asset
to the working relationship between a client and a CPA firm.
To rotate the CPA firms among clients would make the CPA
firms feel that the effort put forth over the years for
more efficient communication and better performance of the
audit engagement was for naught.

No CPA would not be able

to build

upon the hours of work,

in some cases the years

of work,

which have been invested with a given client.
Putting aside the issue of a good, long working re

lationship, no CPA would like to lose a large, steady
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client as a source of revenue.

This point is never men

tioned in articles on rotation of auditors.
should be.

However, it

Large clients involve large fees.

up a steady clientele takes years of work.

To build

If the policy

of auditor rotation becomes general, a given CPA's clien
tele would be continuously changing and would cause new
assessments to be made in terms of both the time and
effort necessary to be expended on each client every year,
not to mention the fluctuation of anticipated revenue from
fees.
Adverse Effects of Installing
New Auditors
The second disadvantage of rotation of auditors can
be discussed in terms of the problems which arise when new
auditors are installed.

If a policy of rotation of audi

tors was adopted, the adverse effects of installing new
auditors would have to be dealt with on a frequent basis.
Examination of these adverse effects focuses attention on
the following separate areas:
1.

Effect on fees

2.

Effect on time

3.

Effect on efficiency
Effect on Fees

Before discussing the ultimate effect of installing
new auditors on the amount of the fee which a CPA firm
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charges a client, it is perhaps helpful to understand the
components of a fee and how a fee is determined.
Basically a fee must be such as to cover direct
expenses and general operating expenses, and also to earn
a return for the partners of the firm.

Accountants gener

ally take into consideration several of the following
factors when determining a fee:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

Time spent on the engagement
Technical importance of the engagement
(the responsibility assumed)
Value of the services to the client
Risk factors involved
Staff availability
Ability of t!'- client to pay
Maintaining professional standards
(attendance at conferences, additional
schooling, etc.)
Maintaining our facilities (staff,
office equipment, library costs, etc.)
Reputation of the firm (will it be
enhanced by performing the services
for the client?)
Our "life needs" (enough money to pro
vide a desired standard of living)
Keeping pace with national economic
picture (rate-of-inflation, adjust
ments )
Minimum fee factors (the going rate
within the community; what was charged
in prior years or in similar circum
stances)
^
Various ethical considerations.

The Objective Portion of a Fee
The objective portion of a fee can be looked upon
as being composed of a time factor, a research element, and
certain direct and overhead expenses.

Bernard B. Eder, "A Three-Step Method of Arriving
at a Fair Fee," The Practical Accountant, Vol. 5 (July/
August, 1972), p. 28.
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The first of these components, time, is unques
tionably the largest element of any fee.

In general, this

factor is viewed mostly from the standpoint of the number
of hours worked by the auditing staff.

Their hourly rate

would be based upon their salary, payroll taxes, insurance
expense and other expenses directly related to the staff.
Since the time devoted by the staff to a particular engage
ment is such an important factor, it is necessary to keep
very accurate records of the time spent on each particular
assignment.^
In addition to the staff time, it is equally im
portant for the time which a partner spends administering,
planning and supervising the total effort of the engage
ment to be added into the fee.

Even though the partner's

part of the fee may be more arbitrarily determined, this
does not mean that it can be overlooked.

3

Another phase of the time component which must be
discussed is the time which is spent by the clerical staff
in typing and proof-reading final reports.
this be handled?

How should

Should it be charged to the client or

treated as a part of overhead?

Either method is acceptable,

although most firms will generally include in the fee a

o
W. H. Morgan, "The Objective Elements in a Fee,"
The Accountants' Journal (New Zealand), Vol. 52 (October,
1973), p. 114.
"^Ibid.
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charge for the amount of time the clerical staff spent on
the work of a given client.

4

The second objective component of a fee can be
accounted for in terms of the amount of research that is
necessary to complete a particular assignment.

In some

cases it is necessary for some research to be done to
determine the generally accepted accounting principles that
apply or the pertinent auditing procedures that must be
carried out.

Other cases may require investigation to

determine whether the client conforms to certain rules and
regulations enforced by government agencies.

The area

where the most research may be done is in the area of a
client's tax problems.

A considerable amount of research

time may need to be devoted to this area.

5

The third objective component of a fee involves
certain direct and overhead expenses.

Direct expenses are

such items as out-of-town travel, hotel accommodations,
meals, and business telephone calls.

These are types of

expenses which might arise if an auditor is required to
go out of town on a client's engagement.
items are included in the client's fee.

Generally, these
Overhead expenses

are those expenses of the firm which help the firm to
operate a going practice.

^Ibid.

5

Ibid.

These items include rent,
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telephone, insurance, office supplies, office equipment
depreciation, and any time of the partners which is nonchargeable to a given client.

The total of all these items

is applied to the clients on the basis that these expenses
are necessary to keep the firm operating and available to
render services to all of the clients.

The basis for

application of overhead costs to each client might employ
an hourly burden rate.

This hourly burden rate would be

derived by dividing the total overhead cost by the total
number of hours chargeable to clients for a given year.

A

better method, however, would be to charge each client with
overhead depending upon the level of work done.

In other

words, work done by the junior staff member as opposed to
work done by a partner would carry a lower overhead charge
per hour.^
In the final analysis, a fee is objectively based
on the amount of time spent by the staff and partners on
the engagement.

The time value of a fee can be expressed

as composed of a labor rate, the difficulty of a job and
the ability of the staff man.

7

In addition, another part

of the fee is the result of an allocated portion of over
head .

6Ibid., p. 115.
7
Eder, "A Three-Step Method of Arriving at a Fair
F e e ," p . 28.
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The Subjective Portion of a Fee
The subjective portion of a fee is based upon a
determination of what is of value to a client.

The techni

cal importance of the work done for a client, the impor
tance of the services rendered to the client, the personal
judgment factor of the accountant, and the extent of con
venience extended to the client are the major factors which
cause a fee to have a certain portion which is subjectively
determined.
What are the elements of value that are looked for
in an engagement?

There are three general groups of the

elements of value to a client.

There are those elements

which can be rewarded through a person's salary and keyed
into a rate based upon time spent on an engagement.

There

are value elements which come from an accountant's techni
cal achievements.

These achievements may only be par

tially rewarded through a salary and are directly related
to an accountant's skill and experience.

Finally, there

are those elements of value to a client which have little
or nothing to do with the amount of time spent by the
g
accountant on a particular engagement.
Keeping in mind the idea of value, it is important
to realize that the fee may be based to a large extent on

g
W. H. Morgan, "The Subjective Elements in a Fee,"
The Accountants' Journal (New Zealand), Vol. 52 (April,
1974), p. 345.
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the technical importance of the work done for the client.
What the level of technical importance is will be deter
mined by relating the following six factors:
1.

Level of work performed;

2.

Sufficiency of records which support the
work;

3.

Proposed uses of the completed reports;

4.

Dollar amounts involved;

5.

Rules, regulations or requirements demanded
by government agencies; and

6.

Liability of the accountant to outside
third parties.

The level of technical importance will have much to do with
the size of the fee.

Especially when considering the

potential liability of accountants to third parties, it
can be seen that a fee could be high.

It is only reason

able that the fee charged would bear some relation to the
risk involved, as well as to the importance of the services
rendered.^
How does one determine the value or importance of
the services rendered to a client?

Many accountants use

as an indication of value the savings that are made for
the client as a result of the services.

If considerable

savi'ngs are shown to be achieved through the design and

9

Ibid.
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installation of a new accounting system, or through the
reduction of operating costs, or through savings in income
taxes, this can bear a direct relation to a measure of the
value of the services to the client.

This may give a

good indication of the fee to be charged.
A further subjective component of any fee is the
personal judgment of the accountant.

In numerous situa

tions, doing the correct thing may not be nearly as impor
tant as first being able to determine the correct course
of action.

This may require very little time, but in the

judgment of the accountant, may be extremely valuable to
the client.

In determining the value of services to a

client and using one's judgment, an accountant must con
sider the following three factors:
1.
2.
3.

The intrinsic value to the client of the
work performed
The degree of success in attaining the
purpose for which the work was required
The purpose itself.H

By evaluating these three factors, an accountant can exer
cise his professional judgment in determining some portion
of a client's fee.
Still another subjective component of a fee is the
convenience to a client.

It is hard to quantify this com

ponent, but it must be given some weight in determining a

11

Ibid.
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fee.

When meetings are conducted in the accountant's

office rather than on the premises of the client, the fees
may be lower since a trip out of the office was avoided.
Another facet of convenience to the client deals with when
he requires his work to be done.

If the work must be

accomplished during a period of time when there is already
an overload, rather than in a slack period, the fee to the
client may be higher.

12

Factors Leading to Fee Revision
The basic fee to a client is made up of the objec
tive portion and the subjective portion discussed above.
Once the basic fee is established, what factors can cause
a fee to be revised?

Generally fees are increased when a

fee revision is contemplated.

The reasons cited most

often for an increase are the general economic environ
ment, the long time elapsed since a prior fee adjustment,
increased involvement in a client's affairs, and a change
in a client's ownership structure, or diversification of
a client's business interests.

13

The general economic environment has been one of
inflation over the past several years.

This upward trend

12Ibid., p. 346.
Bernard B. Eder, "Fee Increases: When, How
Much, and How?" The Practical Accountant, Vol. 7 (July/
August, 1974), p. 26.
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has caused increases in payroll expenses, fringe benefits,
rent and all other costs of operating a business.
will create the need to revise a client's fee.

This

14

In the case where a client has been receiving the
services of an accounting firm for a number of years, it
may have been a long time since any increase in fees has
occurred.

By comparing the increased cost of doing busi

ness with the situation that existed when a fee was ini
tially established, the accountant may find it necessary
.
15
to revise a fee.
In many situations it becomes necessary for the
accountant to become more involved in a client's business
affairs.

This may be due to new regulations of the govern

ment, to an increase in the volume of the client's busi
ness, or to an expanding of the facilities of a client and
the need to modernize his accounting system.

The evolve-

ment of more complex accounting requirements within the
accounting profession may cause increased involvement on
the part of the accountant in a client's affairs.
increased involvement can lead to a fee increase.

This
16

When a client's business undergoes a change in
structure, either through a change in ownership or a change

14
15

Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid.

^Ibid.

83
in the overall composition of the business, it is necessary
for the accountant to devote more time to that client's
particular problems.

More research and management advis

ory services may be needed.

This additional activity can

cause a client's fee to increase.x ^
To determine a fee that is both reasonable and
appropriate for each client, the accountant and the client
need to remember the following key factors:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

An auditor who has an adequate organization
to perform the examination should be se
lected. An adequate organization would in
clude auditors, specialists and office
clerical staff.
The competence of the auditor's personnel
and their ability to perform an audit of
proper scope and in an economical manner
should be reviewed.
The auditor should understand who the client
is, the purpose of the examination, and
with whom the arrangements are to be made.
Written evidence should be made of these
understandings.
The audit work to be performed should be
planned and target dates set for the com
pletion of specific phases of the audit.
Company [client's] personnel should be used
for routine work where possible.
The auditor should discuss his findings as
well as problem areas such as statement
presentations and the wording of his opinion,
with the president of the company.
Problems encountered during the audit should
be reviewed and solutions should be found
that will facilitate the audit of the fol
lowing year.
Fees should be reviewed, especially when in
creases are proposed and they should be

17

Ibid.
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compared with fees of other auditors, and
those paid by comparable companies.
Separate detailed billings for special work
and services performed outside the scope
of the audit should be requested.
Management should maintain an annual review
of the trend in audit fees, keeping in mind
the growth of the company and the complex
ity of the business.18

9.
10.

Having examined the various aspects of determining
a fee, what is the disadvantage of a policy of rotation of
auditors as it affects fees?

Basically, rotation of

auditors is opposed because the use of new auditors on a
job is more costly to the client than the use of the prior
year's auditing firm.

The fee for an initial audit of a

client by an auditing firm is generally higher than for
subsequent audits.

This is due to the time involved.

It

has been estimated that it costs twice as much to perform
the first audit as it does to carry out subsequent
-4. 19
audits.

The adverse effect which rotation of auditors has
on a client's fee is closely tied to the adverse effect
on another area— time.
Effect on Time
When a new auditor begins working with a client,
he requires a great deal of time to gather a large amount
18

Thomas Fee, "Controlling the Audit Fee," Manage
ment Accounting, Vol. 56 (February, 1975), p. 49.
19

N. Loyall McLaren, "Rotation of Auditors," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 106 (July, 1958), p. 43.
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of information.

This process is extremely time consum

ing .
Whenever an auditor is engaged by a client, he
must plan his time in order to meet an important deadline.
This deadline is the date set for making available to the
board of directors and the stockholders the published
financial statements.

As a result of the additional time

required to gather information on a first audit, the audi
tor may find himself pushed in terms of time available to
get everything done.

As a result of the time pressure,

the auditor may not be able to perform the audit as
thoroughly as it should be done.

An auditor who has worked

with the client in the past can generally make better use
of the time available, especially in the areas of review
ing internal control, testing and discovering problems
which need to be investigated.

20

The overall effect on time of adopting a policy of
rotation of auditors is to cause a greater amount of time
to be spent on each new audit.

Whenever a new firm of

auditors is engaged by the client, this will cause more
time to be spent by the auditors in gathering essential
data, as well as more time to be spent by the client in
supplying the needed data to a new firm of auditors.

Robert K. Mautz, "Rotation of Auditors," Finan
cial Executive, Vol. 42 (July, 1974), p. 52.
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Rotation of auditors will result in added costs to both the
client and the auditor simply as a result of the additional
time necessary on an initial audit.

This effect on time

involved ties directly in with the effect on fees previ
ously discussed.
The third major area which is affected by the in
stallation of new auditors in a client’s business is effi
ciency.
Effect on Efficiency
The installation of new auditors can have adverse
effects on the level of efficiency achieved during an
audit engagement.

When new auditors come into a client's

office, it takes time to become acquainted with new pro
cedures as well as with the client's personnel.

Gaining

certain necessary data may rely on successful communication
with the client's staff.

A new auditor may find it diffi

cult at first to gain the complete cooperation of the
client's staff.

It is only human for this to happen.

It

takes time for the new auditor to get to know and communi
cate well with the client and his personnel.

This failure

to cooperate fully with a new auditor can cause the auditor's efficiency to be diminished.

McLaren,

21

"Rotation of Auditors," p. 43.
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The level of efficiency at which an auditor per
forms on a given audit is related to the amount of knowl
edge which the auditor possesses about the client.

When a

new firm of auditors is installed, this level of efficiency
is drastically reduced simply because the fund of previous
knowledge about the client is zero.

It takes time and

effort to build up the knowledge as well as the level of
efficiency in conducting an audit.
Not only the efficiency of the auditor but the
overall efficiency of the client's business is affected
when the auditors are new.

It takes more time to give a

new auditor the information he needs and to introduce him
to the company procedures and personnel with whom he will
be dealing.

This time involved causes a disruption in

the client's flow of work and consequently, an overall
decrease in the effectiveness of the total operations of
the client's business.
Even though a new auditor may bring new ideas into
a client's office, it must be realized that a new auditor
may also be less efficient and thorough.

The installa

tion of new auditors which would occur if a policy of
rotation of auditors was adopted would cause many adverse
effects for the clients as well as for the auditors.
These adverse effects are seen mainly as increased fees,
increased time spent on audits, and a reduced level of
overall efficiency.
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Experience and Information Loss
from Previous Audits
The third disadvantage of rotation of auditors is
the loss of experience and information from previous
audits.

This point is often discussed in the literature

opposing a rotation policy.

When a new auditor comes to

a client, he has to build a fund of knowledge with regard
to his client.

He has lost the benefit which has been

gained by the past auditor in terms of previous experience
with the client and historical information upon which the
past auditor would have been able to rely.
One way in which a new auditor might be able to
overcome this loss of experience and information from
previous audits is by relying on the work and reports of
the previous auditor.

However, he cannot rely on this

previous work to the extent of accepting it at face value.
The new auditor must satisfy himself as to the beginning
account balances and as to the consistent application of
generally accepted accounting principles.

Even though the

new auditor communicates with the predecessor auditor, the
new auditor cannot relieve himself of the responsibility
for the previous work simply by referring to the previous
auditor's work and report.

22

22

Dennis S. Neier, "Using the Work and Reports of
Other Auditors," The New York Certified Public Accountant,
Vol. 41 (October, 1971), p. 725.
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In October of 1975, the Auditing Standards Execu
tive Committee issued Statement on Auditing Standards No. 7
entitled "Communications Between Predecessor and Successor
Auditors."

This statement was issued as a means of pro

viding the accounting profession with guidelines for com
munication between a predecessor and a successor auditor.
This statement discusses two types of communication.

The

first type of communication is communication before a suc
cessor accepts the engagement, and the second is communi
cation between a predecessor and a successor auditor after
23
acceptance of an engagement.
After an auditor accepts an engagement, the suc
cessor auditor may find it necessary to inquire specific
ally about items which he feels may affect the performance
of his audit.

Such items might include certain areas

which need a great deal of time to explore or particular
audit problems that materialized as a result of the cli
ent's accounting system and records.

In addition, the

successor auditor may review the predecessor's working
papers.

The procedure for this step is clearly outlined

in the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 7 as follows:
The successor auditor should request the cli
ent to authorize the predecessor to allow a re
view of the predecessor's working papers.
It is

23

Statement on Auditing Standards No. 7: Communi
cations Between Predecessor and Successor Auditors (New
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Inc., 1975), pp. 2-3.
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customary in such circumstances for the prede
cessor auditor to make himself available to the
successor auditor for consultation and to make
available for review certain of his working
papers.
The predecessor and successor auditors
should agree on those working papers that are
to be made available for review and those that
may be copied.
Ordinarily, the predecessor
should permit the successor to review working
papers relating to matters of continuing ac
counting significance, such as the working
paper analysis of balance sheet accounts, both
current and noncurrent, and those relating to
contingencies.24
By following these guidelines, a successor auditor
may be able to overcome some of the loss of information
which is experienced when a change in auditors takes
place.

However, this communication will not completely

make up for the loss of information and for the experience
loss.

The experience gained by a continuing relationship

between an auditor and a client can be of invaluable bene
fit to a client.

A background of information and experi

ence is built up between the client and the auditor which
enables the auditor to offer sound advice about the
operations, procedures and controls of the client's opera25
tions.
The experience and information loss from previous
audits which is a big disadvantage of a policy of rotating

24
25

Ibid., p. 3.

Alan J. Winters, "Looking at the Auditor Rota
tion Issue," Management Accounting, Vol. 57 (March,
1976), p. 30.

91
auditors is closely associated with a fourth disadvantage,
the disruption of the services offered to a client.
Disruption of Services Offered
to a Client
Another disadvantage that is often discussed in
connection with the loss of experience and information is
the general disruption of the services offered to a par
ticular client.
Many clients do not want a change in the auditor
who performs their particular audit.

They feel that the

experience and information gathered about the problems
and overall operations of the company enable the auditor
to conduct a better a”dit.

In addition to performing a

better audit, the accountant is in a better position to
offer advice on taxes, system design, Securities and Exchange Commission work and management advising.

26

The quality of the services rendered to a client
could be less if auditors were rotated.

The mere disrup

tion of services, coupled with information and experience
loss, could provide the client with a level of work of
inferior quality rather than one of excellent quality, even
though the audit and other services are conducted from a
fresh point of view.

The auditor who has had a long, con

tinuous working relationship with a client is the one who

McLaren,

"Rotation of Auditors," p. 43.
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is best capable of offering help and advice to management
in all of the areas in which the accounting profession pro
vides services, from auditing to management advisory ser
vices.

The disruption of these services for the client

would hardly seem to serve much benefit.
Summary
When examining any proposal, it is necessary to
discuss both the positive points and the negative points.
This chapter has presented and discussed the disadvantages
of adopting a policy of rotation of auditors within the
profession.

The first disadvantage is the loss of large

clients by CPA firms.

The second disadvantage is the ad

verse effects which are experienced when new auditors are
installed.

These adverse effects are evident in the areas

of fees, time, and efficiency.

A third disadvantage is

the loss of experience and information from previous
audits.

A fourth disadvantage is the disruption in the

overall services which are offered to a client.

Having

discussed the advantages of rotation of auditors in the
preceding chapter and the disadvantages of rotation of
auditors in this chapter, the following chapter will pre
sent the results of a survey in which the general prac
tices of selecting, rotating, and retaining auditors are
explored.

Chapter 4
THE RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES
This chapter presents the results of the question
naires mailed to the controllers of the United States
largest industrials and to CPA firms.

As explained in

Chapter 1, the questionnaire for controllers was mailed
to each of the companies in the Fortune 500 listing.

The

questionnaire for CPA firms was mailed to a partner in the
main office of each of the "Big 8" and "Big 7" firms.
This chapter will be divided into two main sec
tions.

The first section will discuss the results of the

questionnaire to controllers.

The second section will

discuss the results of the questionnaire to CPA firms.
Responses of the Controllers
Of the 500 questionnaires which were sent to the
controllers of the Fortune 500 companies, 339 responded,
which was a 67.80% response rate.

Of the 339, four com

panies stated that they could not participate.

Therefore,

the following data which are presented are based on the
335 useable responses.
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Selection of the Auditor
The first three questions of the questionnaire
dealt with the area of selection of the auditor.

The

first question asked whether the company had an audit com
mittee.

Of the 335 respondents, 315

(94.03%) companies

indicated they did have an audit committee, while 20
(5.97%) companies indicated they did not.

The formation

of audit committees to help the company deal with inde
pendent auditors has received more and more attention over
the last several years.

It is not surprising that 94.03%

of the respondent companies have audit committees.

By

June 30, 1978, all domestic companies who list their com
mon stock on the New York Stock Exchange must have audit
committees formed."*The second question asked whether the audit com
mittee selected the outside CPA firm.
ents, 193

(57.61%) said yes; 136

Of the 335 respond

(40.60%) said no; a few

(6, 1.79%) did not answer the question.

Since one of the

main functions of the audit committee is to help in se
lecting the outside CPA firm, these results agree with most
of the literature written on the functions of the audit
committee.

R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann, Corporate Audit
Committees;
Policies and Practices (Altamonte Springs,
Florida:
The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc., 1977),
p. 19.
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The third question asked the respondent the fol
lowing question:

"If the answer to #2 is No, then who does

select the CPA firm to perform the annual audit?"

This

question, coupled with the previous question, caused many
of the respondents to explain the selection process of
the auditor in which the company engaged.

Of the 193 re

spondents who indicated that the audit committee selected
the CPA firm, 29 of them also answered question 3 as a
means of further explanation.

The 136 who answered "no"

to question 2 gave several different procedures followed
for selecting the auditor in answer to question 3.

Table

1 on page 96 presents the various procedures of all of the
335 respondents.

As the table indicates, there are many

different procedures for selecting the outside independ
ent CPA firm to perform the annual audit.
Retention of the Auditor
The results of question 4 showed a wide range of
answers to the number of years that the present auditing
firm had been auditing the company.

There are 56 (16.72%)

firms of the 335 respondents which have had the same audit
ing firm for 50 years or more.

Table 2 on page 9 7 shows

the overall responses of the companies to this question
which range from less than one year to 80 years.
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Table 1
PROCEDURE FOR AUDITOR SELECTION
Procedure
Board of Directors recommends; Stock
holders approve
Management recommends; Board of
Directors selects
Shareholders select
Board of Directors selects
Management selects
Management recommends; Stockholders
ratify
Management and audit committee select
Management recommends to audit com
mittee who recommends to Board of
Directors who selects
Management recommends to audit com
mittee who recommends to Board of
Directors who recommends to Stock
holders who approve
Executive committee selects
Parent company selects
Audit committee recommends to Board
of Directors who select
Controller selects with the approval
of the audit committee
Audit committee recommends to Board
of Directors who approve and
present the selection to the
Stockholders for final approval
Audit committee recommends; Stock
holders approve
Audit committee selects
No method stated other than "not the
audit committee"
No answer
Total

Number

Percent

15

4.48

5

1.49
6. 57
7. 46

22

25
9
2.

13

2.68

0.60
3.88
0. 30

1
1
1

0. 30
0.30
0. 30

21

6. 27

1

0.30

27

8. 06

20

5. 97
48. 95

164
1
6

0.30
1.79

335

100.00

Table 2
RETENTION OF THE PRESENT AUDITING FIRM
Years
Retained

Companies
o
o
#

Less than 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

13
6
4
6
4
6
1
4
4
3
18
3
4
2
3
18
2
4
3
0
30

3. 88
1. 79
1.19
1. 79
1.19
1.79
0. 30
1.19
1.19
0. 90
5.36
0. 90
1.19
0.60
0.90
5. 36
0.60
1.19
0.90
0 . 00
8.95

Years
Retained
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Companies
o
"O
#
2
3
2
2
28
1
3
5
1
31
2
1
3
3
7
1
1
1
0
20
1

0.60
0.90
0.60
0.60
8.36
0. 30
0.90
1.49
0. 30
9.25
0.60
0. 30
0.90
0.90
2. 08
0. 30
0. 30
0. 30
0.00
5.97
0.30

Years
Retained
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Companies
o,
o
#

Years
Retained

0
1
2
9
1
0
3
0
23
1
2
0
1
0
1
1
2
1
6
1
2

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
No useable
answer

0. 00
0. 30
0.60
2.68
0.30
0 . 00
0. 90
0. 00'
6.86
0. 30
0.60
0 . 00
0. 30
0 . 00
0. 30
0.30
0.60
0. 30
1.79
0.30
0.60

Total

Companies
g,
o
#
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
4
1
0
1
0
3
0
1
2

0.00
0. 00
0. 30
0.00
0.30
0. 30
0.00
1.19
0. 30
0.00
0.30
0.00
0. 90
0 . 00
0. 30
0 . 00
0 . 00
0.60

7

2.08

335

100.00

0
0

i£>
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Rotation of the Auditor
The remaining questions on the questionnaire ex
plored the present practices of the companies as to the
rotation of auditing firms as well as the opinions of the
controllers concerning the rotation of auditors.
The fifth and sixth questions asked the company
whether it changed auditing firms on a regular basis and
if so, how often.

Of the 335 respondents, 327 (97.61%)

answered no; 5 (1.49%) answered yes; and 3 (0.90%) gave
no answer.

Of the five that answered yes, two companies

indicated that they changed auditing firms every 3 to 5
years; two companies changed auditing firms on a basis of
more than 5 years; and one firm gave no answer as to how
frequently a change took place.
The seventh question asked the controller whether
he felt that an auditor may become lax in his approach to
the audit engagement of the same company over a period of
years.

A majority of the respondents, 290

that this would not be a problem.
that this might be a problem.

(86.57%), felt

Only 36 (10.75%) agreed

There were 9 (2.68%) who

gave no answer.
The eighth question asked the controller for his
opinion concerning an auditor's independence after being
with the same corporation for a period of years.
were 306

There

(91.34%) respondents who felt that an auditor

would not be considered less than independent after a
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period of years with the same client-corporation.

Only 24

(7.17%) felt that there would be a problem concerning the
auditor's independence.

Five respondents

(1.49%) gave no

answer.
The ninth and tenth questions were related.

The

controller was asked whether he favored a policy of auto
matically changing independent auditing firms on a routine
basis.

If he answered yes, he was asked how often they

should be changed.

The results of this question show that

an overwhelming number of respondents

(322, 96.12%) are

against this policy.

A small number

favor of the policy.

A few respondents

to answer the question.

(10, 2.99%) are in
(3, 0.89%) failed

Of the 10 who answered that they

did favor a policy of automatically changing independent
auditing firms on a routine basis, 4 respondents favored a
policy of changing every 3 to 5 years and 6 respondents
favored a policy of using a basis of more than 5 years.
The eleventh and twelfth questions explored the con
trollers' feelings about whether by changing auditors on a
routine basis, they felt the company would be provided
with a more objective evaluation of their accounting sys
tem and financial statements.

The respondents were asked

to explain why they felt as they did.
respondents

The majority of the

(310, 92.54%) did not fe6l that a change in

auditors would provide a company with a more objective
evaluation.

Only 18 (5.37%) respondents felt that by
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changing auditors, a more objective evaluation would be
achieved.

Seven

(2.09%) respondents gave no answer.

When

asked why they felt as they did, the 310 respondents, who
answered no to the preceding question, gave several differ
ent reasons.
page 101.

These reasons are presented in Table 3 on

The results agree with several of the disadvan

tages of the rotation of auditors which were discussed in
Chapter 3.
The following responses are representative of the
type of opinions which are grouped in Table 3 as "other
comments":
The objective evaluation of an accounting sys
tem depends on the ability and integrity of the
accounting firm performing the audit.
This is
not necessarily improved by routine rotation.
The professional auditor is objective by
definition - if this were to be questioned, then
the entire system should be discarded.
CPA firms are no different than other profes
sionals.
Should people change doctors (M.D.'s)
or lawyers periodically? Change does not insure
objectivity.
There were a total of 18 (5.37%) respondents who
agreed that changing auditors was worthwhile.

Their main

reason for agreeing was that they felt that rotation would
provide a greater degree of independence and a fresh point
of view.

Of the 18 respondents, 11 (61.11%) stated this

opinion.

The remaining 7 (38.89%) respondents expressed

their opinions a little differently.

The following four

opinions express some of the areas of concern which arise
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Table 3
VIEWS EXPRESSED AGAINST ROTATION
View

Number

Percent

Auditors rotate within the firm on a
job and supply a fresh point of
view, maintain their independence
and overcome the problem of lax
ness

132

42. 58

Rotation would require too much time
and money to be spent educating
a new auditing firm to the pro
cedures of the company

29

9. 35

A higher quality audit is performed by
an auditing firm who has a complete
understanding of the company and
can provide the insight of many
years of association with the com
pany and its problems.
Continuity
is more valuable than change.

54

17. 42

The professional standards of the
accounting profession and the pos
sibility of peer reviews as well
as pressure of potential litiga
tion are enough to assure independ
ence and a high quality audit.

6

1. 94

Other comments

46

14.84

No opinion

43

13.87

310

100.00

Total

when auditing firms continue in long associations with
clients:
Work becomes routine; opinions are formed
over a period of time that could tend to
limit objectivity.
Normally a firm becomes stale in their
approach if they remain too long.
They begin
to assume too much and become comfortable
with the client's staff.
A CPA firm would tend to be more assertive
in its observation if it knew another firm
would be "looking over their shoulders" the
next year or so.
. Currently, I think managements have a
tendency to influence auditing firms, pri
marily because of the revenues involved to
the auditing firms.
The opinions of the 18 respondents who favored rotation ex
press several of the advantages of rotation of auditors
which were discussed in Chapter 2.
The last specific question of the survey asked the
respondent to answer the following:

"Do you foresee any

change which your corporation will make in the future with
regard to the policy of selecting the independent CPA
firm?"

The majority of the respondents

(295, 88.06%) re

plied no; 25 (7.46%) replied yes; and 15 (4.48%) gave no
answer.

Of the 25 respondents who indicated a change in

the future, some further explained what the change might be.
Two of these possible changes were given as follows:
If the authorities and the public continue to
question independence of CPAs, some rotation of
firms probably will be required.

103
It's possible that we would consider throw
ing the audit open to bid each 5 years or so to
ensure price competitiveness.
The final part of the questionnaire invited the re
spondents to make additional comments.

Of the 335 respond

ents, only 17 (5.07%) participated further.

All of the 17

respondents were opposed to a policy of rotation of audi
tors.

Two comments in particular summarize the majority

viewpoint which does not favor a policy of rotation of audi
tors.

One controller remarked:
Rotation of firms is expensive and not the
answer.
The answer is the background and
capability of the audit partner and of the
staff.
The second answer is to have a welltrained, well qualified, well-paid accounting
department.
Management cannot escape respon
sibility by blaming auditors.

Another controller concluded:
Companies that use the services of small
firms might do well to change (rotate) auditors
from time to time since smaller auditing firms
may not be able to rotate personnel on the
account so easily.
The pressure (presumably
coming from the government regulatory agencies
and possibly academia) to have mandatory rota
tion of independent public accountants smacks
of the usual unfortunate suspicions that the
"public sector" seem to harbour with respect to
the "private sector."
It completely ignores
the fact that the major characteristic, other
than competence, that public accountants have
to offer is integrity and independence.
It is
in their own best interests to maintain that
posture and the good ones do. The costs of re
placing auditors because of the time it takes
for new firms to become acquainted with individ
ual company procedures more than offsets the
potential benefit to shareholders - and the pub
lic - unless there have been some "sweetheart"
deals - but sweetheart deals are not in the
best interest in the long run of the accounting
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firms.
Furthermore, auditing firms who know
the business and the client and are still inde
pendent are more likely to be of greater help
to their client by virtue of their superior
knowledge of the company.
Cross Analyses
Some interesting cross analyses follow.

Of the 328

(97.91%) respondents who indicated the number of years that
the present auditing firm had been auditing the company,
319 of those answered whether or not they felt that an
auditor may become lax in his approach to the audit engage
ment of the same company over a period of years.
319, 284 (89.03%) felt that this would not occur.
35 (10.97%) indicated that laxness might occur.

Of the
However,
Table 4

on page 105 shows how many years the same firm has audited
the company where the controller felt that laxness might
have occurred.

It is interesting to note that the remain

ing 284 respondents to the question dealing with an audi
tor's laxness have had the same auditing firm for periods of
less than a year up to periods of 80 years.

No respondent

whose company has had the same auditing firm for more than
52 years, i.e., 30 companies, felt that laxness was a
problem.
Another cross analysis was drawn between the number
of years that the same auditing firm had been auditing the
company and the opinion of the controller as to whether the
auditor may be considered to be less than independent after
a period of years.

Although 24 (7.16%) respondents of the
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Table 4
YEARS OF SERVICE BY SAME FIRM COUPLED
WITH POSSIBLE LAXNESS

Years of Service
Less than 1 Year
1
10
15
18
20
25
26
28
29
30
32
34
38
40
45
48
50
52
Total

Number of Controllers Who
Feel Laxness May Become a
Problem
Number
Percent
3
2
1
2
1
2
4
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
3
1
1
5
1

8. 57
5.71
2.86
5. 71
2.86
5.71
11.42
2.86
2.86
2.86
8. 57
2.86
2.86
2. 86
8. 57
2. 86
2. 86
14.28
2. 86

35

100.00
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335 felt that independence might be a problem, only 23 of
these gave an answer as to how many years the same firm had
been auditing the company.

Table 5 on page 107 summarizes

the results of this cross analysis.

As in the previous

cross analysis, the majority of the firms feel that after
a period of years with the same corporation, an auditor
will not be considered less than independent.

Even the 30

companies who have had their same auditing firm in excess
of 52 years do not feel that the independence issue is a
problem.
Responses of the CPAs
A questionnaire was mailed to one partner in the
main office of each of the accounting firms known as the
"Big 8" and the "Big 7."

The response rate of the question

naire was 66.67%, totaling 10 useable responses.
Selection of the Auditor
The first four questions of the CPA questionnaire
dealt with the area of selection of the auditing firm.
The first question asked what percentage of the corpora
tions that the CPA firm audited had audit committees.

Of

the 10 respondents, 2 (20%) said 50%; 1 (10%) said 5%;
1 (10%) said 20%; 1 (10% said less than 1%; and 1 (10%)
indicated that more than 80% of his clients had audit com
mittees.

Four

(40%) respondents stated that no information

was available in answer to this question.
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Table 5
YEARS OF SERVICE BY SAME FIRM COUPLED WITH
POSSIBLE LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE

Years of Service
than 1 Year

Number of Controllers Who
Feel Loss of Independence
May Become a Problem
Number
Percent
3

13.04

1

1

4.35

2

1

4. 35

5

1

4 .35

20

1

4. 35

25

3

13.04

30

2

8.69

32

1

4. 35

34

1

4.35

40

2

8.69

45

1

4. 35

48

1

4. 35

50

4

17.39

52

1

4.35

23

100.00

Total
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In the second question, the respondents were to in
dicate whether or not the audit committee, if the company
had one, selected the outside CPA firm.

One

spondent indicated yes and 3 (30%) said no.
tion was unavailable from one respondent.

(10%) re
The informa

The remaining

5 (50%) gave the following explanations:
Two (20%) replied:
It [the audit committee] generally plays an
important role.
Two (20%) said:
Some do; most do not.
One (10%) commented:
Seems to be a movement toward selection by
audit committees.
The respondents were questioned next as to who did
select the CPA firm in corporations that had audit commit
tees but whose audit committee did not make the selection.
Seven (70%) respondents who supplied information to this
question outlined several methods of auditor selection.
One said the Board of Directors made the choice; two said
management did; one said the Board of Directors or stock
holders did.

The remaining three gave the following re

sponses :
Management recommends and the audit commit
tee approves.
The chief executive officer selects with
the approval of the Board of Directors.
The audit committee recommends but the
Board of Directors appoints the auditor.
The other three respondents gave no answer to this question.
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The fourth question asked the respondents to indi
cate who did select the CPA firm in corporations where
there was no audit committee.

Table 6 below summarizes

the responses.
Table 6
PROCEDURES FOR AUDITOR SELECTION WHERE
NO AUDIT COMMITTEE EXISTS
Procedure

Number

Percent

Chief Executive selects

3

30

Management, Board of Directors or
Stockholders select

1

10

Management selects

3

30

Management or Board of Directors
selects

2

20

No information available

1

10

10

100

Total

Rotation of Auditing Firms
The next several questions explored the area of ro
tation of auditing firms.

The CPAs were asked whether

their clients had a tendency to change auditing firms on
a regular basis.

All of the respondents indicated no.

No

client followed a policy of regularly changing or rotating
the audit firm which performed the annual audit.
The CPAs were asked how often their clients change
audit firms.

Of the ten respondents, 4 (40%) stated a

period of more than five years; 4 (40%) gave no answer, and
1 (10%) stated that there was no found pattern.
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Rotation Practices Within Auditing Firms
The next section of the questionnaire explored the
practices of rotation which the CPA firms engaged in within
their individual firms.

There is a policy of rotating on

a periodic basis the staff assistants on a given client's
audit in 6 (60%) of the CPA firms surveyed.
4 (40%) do not.

The remaining

Of the firms that do rotate staff assist

ants, one does it every two years; two do it every five
years; another does it every two to five years; one limits
continuous service; and one firm gave no answer as to how
often rotation occurs.
There are 6 (60%) of the CPA firms that follow a
policy of rotating on a periodic basis the senior account
ant on a given client's audit.

Four

(40%) do not.

The

six firms that have this policy rotate the senior account
ant as follows:

two said every 3 years; two said every 5

years; one said every 2 to 5 years; and one indicated
limiting continuous service.
Those firms that follow a policy of rotating the
manager in charge of a given client's audit number 6 (60%).
Those that do not, number 4 (40%).

Of the six that do,

four indicated rotation every 5 years; one said every 3
years; and one said every 3 to 5 years.
The pattern of responses to the preceding three
sets of questions changes slightly with the next question.
The question is as follows:

"Is there a policy of rotating

Ill
the partner in charge of a given client's audit?"

Of the

10 respondents, 8 (80%) said yes; 2 (20%) said no.

Of the

8 that said yes, 7 firms change the partner in charge
every 5 years, and 1 firms changes every 5 to 7 years.
Views on Rotation of Auditing Firms
The last part of the questionnaire sent to the
CPAs asked several questions directed at determining their
views on a policy of compulsory rotation of CPA firms
among clients.
The first question posed was as follows:

"In light

of the Metcalf Report and the proceedings of the Senate
Subcommittee with regard to studying how to improve account
ing and auditing, it is necessary for the accounting pro
fession to take some measures toward self-regulation.

With

this in mind, do you feel that the future may hold a policy
of compulsory rotation of CPA firms among clients?"

Of the

10 respondents, 2 (20%) said yes; 8 (80%) said no.
The next two questions asked the respondents whe
ther they felt that such a policy would increase an audi
tor's independence and would cause an auditor to be more
objective in his dealings with clients.

In answer to these

two questions, 1 (10%) said yes, and 9 (90%) said no.
The final question asked the respondents to indi
cate how they felt about a policy of rotating auditing firms
among clients on a routine basis.
question are listed below:

The responses to this
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It would be expensive and counterproduc
tive.
Same result can be achieved by rotat
ing people.
Doesn't make economic sense for any com
pany - the extra cost of rotation will have
to be passed on to all clients without appareent benefit.
Negative:
too costly for client.
Posi
tive and better results can be obtained by
rotating partners on the engagement.
Disagree.
Increase costs without off
setting benefits.
Opposed.
See no advantages.
Whatever is proposed
to be gained by rotating firms can be obtained
as effectively and far more economically by
other means.
Would be more costly and would not improve
performance.
It would raise the costs and reduce the
efficiency of audits and would increase audi
tor independence only in appearance.
We believe such a policy would be counter
productive .
Rotation of independent auditors among
clients would not increase an auditor's inde
pendence or objectivity; however, increasing
responsibility for the independent auditors
and their selection should be placed on the
audit committee.
Summary and concluding remarks of this author are
presented in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A brief summary of this study is given in this
chapter.

Concluding remarks follow this summary, as well

as suggestions of areas for additional research.
Summary of This Study
The objectives of this study are threefold:

(1) to

examine the advantages and disadvantages of the rotation of
auditors,

(2) to survey accountants in public practice and

controllers in industry for their opinions on a policy of
rotation of auditors, and

(3) to examine the results of

the survey and determine whether or not the accounting pro
fession should adopt a policy requiring rotation of audi
tors .
This study began with a literature search to deter
mine what were considered to be the advantages and disad
vantages of the rotation of auditors.

The advantages of a

policy of rotation of auditors are the maintenance of in
dependence, the provision of a fresh point of view, and the
possible reduction of litigation against accountants.

The

disadvantages of a policy of rotation are the possible loss
of large clients by CPA firms, the adverse effects of
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installing new auditors, the experience and information
loss from previous audits, and the disruption of services
offered to a client.

This discussion, presented in Chap

ters 2 and 3, helped to clarify both sides of the issue of
rotation of auditors, thereby accomplishing the first
objective.
The results of a survey of accountants and con
trollers were presented in Chapter 4, fulfilling the sec
ond and third objectives.

Two questionnaires, exploring

the selection, rotation, and retention of independent audi
tors, were sent— one to a group of accountants and another
to a group of controllers.

The controllers of the "Fortune

50 0 companies" were asked to respond to one questionnaire.
The total responses were 339, for a 67.8% response rate.
The group of accountants surveyed was composed of a partner
in each of the main offices of the "Big 8" and the "Big 7"
CPA firms.

The total responses were ten, for a 66.67%

response rate.

The majority of the controllers

(310 or

92.54%) did not feel that by changing auditors on a routine
basis, their company would be provided with a more objec
tive evaluation of its accounting system and financial
statements.

The main reason for this response was that con

trollers felt that rotation within the CPA firm provided a
fresh point of view, maintained independence and reduced
laxness on the part of the CPAs.
controllers.

The CPAs agreed with the

Of the CPA respondents, nine

(90%) did not
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feel that a policy of rotation would cause an auditor to be
more objective in his dealings with clients.

The main

reason given by CPAs for opposing rotation is that they
feel that such a procedure would be too costly and would
be counterproductive.
Conclusions of This Study
The topic of rotation of auditors has long been a
controversial issue.

For more than twenty years, articles

have appeared in various professional journals discussing
the advantages and disadvantages of a policy of rotation
of auditors.

The concluding viewpoint of all of these

articles is that rotation of auditors is not a reasonable
procedure to be implemented within the accounting profes
sion.
The recent interest which has been generated about
the topic of rotation of auditors is a result of the inves
tigation by the United States Senate Subcommittee on Re
ports, Accounting and Management which published its find
ings in March 1977.

In the list of recommendations given

in the study, the fourth recommendation discusses the pos
sibility of mandatory rotation as follows:
Congress should consider methods of increasing
competition among accounting firms for selection
as independent auditors for major corporations. At
present, a single accounting firm, nominated by
management, is placed on the ballot of annual meet
ings of stockholders.
Domination of the corporate
election process by large institutional investors
and management ensures that the accounting firm
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nominated by management is elected.
Long asso
ciation between a corporation and an accounting
firm may lead to such close identification of
the accounting firm with the interests of its
client's management that truly independent
action by the accounting firm becomes diffi
cult .
One alternative is mandatory change of
accountants after a given period of years, or
after any finding by the SEC that the account
ing firm failed to exercise independent action
to protect investors and the public.1
The current interest being exhibited regarding the
regulation of the accounting profession by the SEC, the
government and the profession itself would possibly cause
the profession and the business world to consider a policy
of rotation of auditors, that is, auditing firms.

The

results of the empirical research done in this study indi
cate however that neither the largest representative firms
of the accounting profession, the "Big 8" and the "Big 7,"
nor the controllers of the largest United States industrial
companies are receptive to a policy of mandatory rotation
of auditors.

Only 5.37%

(18) of the controllers felt that

a policy of rotation would provide auditors who would
achieve a more objective evaluation of their company, by
providing a fresh point of view and a greater degree of
independence from management.

Only one CPA felt that a

1
U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reports,
Accounting and Management of the Committee on Government
Operations, The Accounting Establishment:
A Staff Report,
S. Doc. No. 95-34, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977
(Washington, D. C . : Government Printing Office, 1977),
p. 21.
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policy of rotation would cause an auditor to be more ob
jective in his dealings with clients.

Both sets of re

spondents, the controllers and the CPAs, feel that manda
tory rotation would be too costly and disruptive.

The

majority of opinions from both groups indicate that another
method other than mandatory rotation can be used to achieve
greater independence and a fresh, more objective point, of
view.

They are satisfied with the current practice of

internal rotation of accountants working on a client's
audit that is presently practiced by CPA firms.
While the practice of internal staff rotation is
part of a plan of self-regulation for the profession, this
author feels that this practice falls short of the type of
regulation which the United States Senate Subcommittee on
Reports, Accounting and Management is suggesting.

Although

mandatory rotation is only one possibility of regulating
the profession, it is a possibility which should be given
greater attention by the business sector and the profes
sion.

The business sector and the accounting profession

cannot ignore such a policy as rotation of auditors simply
because it is, in their opinion, basically too expensive
to institute.
Areas for Additional Research
In examining the policy of rotation of auditors as
a means of self-regulation by the accounting profession, it
becomes evident that this is still a very controversial
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topic.

Even though the business sector and the profession

are against the policy of mandatory rotation, this does
not mean that such a policy may not be adopted in the
future.

The pressures from the government and society in

general are being brought to bear on the accounting pro
fession, as well as the business sector, with regard to
accounting practices and procedures.
not be ignored.

These pressures can

The accounting profession may find itself

adopting a policy of mandatory rotation of auditors as a
result of a ruling by the SEC or by Congress.

The account

ing profession should open its eyes to such a possibility
rather than assuming that the policy of mandatory rotation
will fade away simply because the accounting profession is
against it.
In several recent articles published in profes
sional journals and newsletters, the idea of self
regulation by the accounting profession has been discussed.
Wallace Olson, president of the American Institute ofCer
tified Public Accountants, in a recent article in the
Journal of Accountancy, discussed the new division of firms
within the AICPA and the range of sanctions that can be
imposed on those firms.

However, he also pointed out the

problem facing the profession in the following comments:
To sum up, the outlook is for more discipli
nary machinery, not less.
The question of whe
ther a new federal regulatory scheme will be
established through legislation hangs in the bal-
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ance, pending an appraisal of the effective
ness of the AICPA division of firms.
It will be a major achievement if the
profession's actions toward self-regulation
prove to be successful in convincing its
critics that additional governmental regula
tion is unnecessary.2
Recent statements by SEC chairman Harold Williams
indicate that the matter of the accounting profession's
practices and procedures are becoming of more and more in
terest to the SEC.

Mr. Williams has been stressing the

need for stronger internal auditors as well as stronger
audit committees.

With regard to self-regulation by the

accounting profession, Mr. Williams recently issued a re
port to the U. S. Congress on the profession's efforts in
this area.

In a recent meeting with the AICPA council,

Mr. Williams stated that the profession's program would be
examined by looking at the issues of independence, quality
control, including self-discipline, and the accounting and
auditing standard-setting process.

In his opinion, the

profession's program can satisfy Congress and the SEC pro
vided that the public oversight board, established in the
AICPA self-regulatory program, is truly independent.

3

Wallace E. Olson, "How Should a Profession Be
Disciplined?" The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 145 (May,
1978), pp. 65-66.
3

"SEC Chairman's Report to Congress," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 146 (July, 1978), p. 3.
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Further possibility of regulation imposed upon the
profession is evidenced by the recent bill introduced into
the House of Representatives by Representative John E.
Moss.

The bill would establish a National Organization of

SEC Accountancy.

The organization would have a five person

SEC appointed board which would investigate auditors and
take disciplinary action against auditing firms and indi4
vidual auditors.
If this bill is passed, the regulatory
pressures felt by the accounting profession will be even
greater than before.
It would be better for the accounting profession to
implement a policy of rotation of auditors voluntarily
rather than have such a policy imposed upon the profession
by an outside agency, be it the United States Congress or
the SEC.

Further discussion and research is needed in the

area of the applicability of a rotation policy to the busi
ness sector as well as in the area of the actual implemen
tation of a policy of mandatory rotation.
Research efforts should be directed toward investi
gating any effort at rotation of auditing firms which have
been instituted to determine what the result of such plans
have been.

Even though the research which was done by

this author did not indicate any such plans for rotation

4

"Moss Proposes a 'National Organization of SEC
Accountancy,1" The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 146 (July,
1978), p. 3.
.
-
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being considered by the large industrials, it is possible
that such rotation policies are carried out by smaller
companies.

Some cities have policies for rotating the

auditing firm which audits their city government agencies.
The City of Wichita in Kansas has a policy of rotating the
auditing firm every three years, which has been carried
out successfully for several years.

5

By examining the

policies of rotation of auditors by city governments, re
search may reveal ways in which a mandatory system of ro
tation of auditors could be effectively implemented by
the accounting profession.

5

"Rotation and Selection of External Auditing
Firms," The Internal Auditor (November/December, 1973),
p . 94.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books, Monographs, Legal Cases and Statutes
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
State
ment on Auditing Standards;
Codification of Auditing
Standards and Procedures. New York: American Insti
tute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973.
Carey, John L. Professional Ethics of Certified Public
Accountants. New York: American Institute of
Accountants, 1956.
Carey, John L . , and William 0. Doherty.
Ethical Standards
of the Accounting Profession. New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1966.
Cashin, James A., ed.
Handbook for Auditors.
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971.

New York:

Defliese, Philip L . , Kenneth P. Johnson, and Roderick K.
Macleod.
Montgomery's Auditing. 9th ed. New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 1975.
Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder.
668, pp. 185-218.

425 U.S. 185, 47 L.Ed.2d

Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation.
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), pp. 643-707.
Fischer v. Kletz.

283 F.S. 643

266 F.S. 180, pp. 180-197.

Grinaker, Robert L . , and Ben B. Barr.
Auditing:
The
Examination of Financial Statements. Homewood,
Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965.
Holmes, Arthur W . , and Wayne S. Overmyer.
Auditing:
Standards and Procedures. 8th ed. Homewood, Illi
nois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975.
Johnson, James T . , and J. Herman Brasseaux.
Readings in
Auditing. Cincinnati:
South-Western Publishing
Company, 1965.

122

123

Kohler, Eric L. Auditing: An Introduction to the Work of
the Public Accountant. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954.
Littleton, A. C. Essays on Accountancy.
University of Illinois Press, 1961.
Mautz, R. K. Fundamentals of Auditing.
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964.

Urbana, Illinois:
New York:

John

Mautz, R. K . , and F. L. Neumann.
Corporate Audit Commit
tees:
Policies and Practices. Altamonte Springs,
Florida:
The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc.,
1977 .
Mautz, R. K . , and Hussein A. Sharaf.
The Philosophy of
Auditing.
American Accounting Association Monograph
5. Evanston, Illinois: American Accounting Association, 1961.
Meigs, Walter B . , E. John Larsen, and Robert F. Meigs.
Principles of Auditing. Homewood, Illinois:
Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1973.
Porter, W. Thomas, Jr., and John C. Burton. Auditing:
A
Conceptual Approach. Belmont, California:
Wadsworth
Publishing Company, Inc., 1971.
Ray, J. C . , ed.
Independent Auditing Standards: A Book
of Readings. New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Robertson, Jack C. Auditing.
Dallas, Texas:
Publications, Inc., 1976.

Business

Roy, Robert H . , and James H. MacNeill.
Horizons for a Pro
fession. New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1967.
SEC Accounting Rules. Topical Law Reports.
Commerce Clearing House, 1968.
Securities Act of 1933.
1934).

New York:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 48 (193 3—

Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
48 (1933-1934).

Statutes at Large, Vol.

Skousen, K. Fred.
An Introduction to the S.E.C.
Cincin
nati:
South-Western Publishing Company, 1976.

124

Statement on Auditing Procedure 41; Subsequent Disclosure
of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditor's Report.
New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Inc., 1969.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 7: Communications
Between Predecessor and Successor Auditors. New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Inc., 1975.
Stettler, Howard F. Auditing Principles:
Objectives, Pro
cedures, Working Papers. Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956.
Taggert, Herbert F . , ed. Paton on Accounting:
Selected
Writings of W. A. Paton. Michigan: The University
of Michigan, 1964.
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche.
255 N.Y. 170 (November
18, 1930 to February 19, 1931), pp. 170-193.
U. S. Congress.
Senate.
Subcommittee on Reports, Account
ing, and Management of the Committee on Government
Operations.
The Accounting Establishment: A Staff
Study. S. Doc. No. 95-34, 95th Congress, 1st Session,
1977. Washington, D. C . : Government Printing
Office, 1977.
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield,
Mass.:
G. and C. Merriam Company, 196 3.
Wise, T. A.
"The Auditors Have Arrived," Contemporary
Accounting and Its Environment, ed. John W. Buckley.
Belmont, California:
Dickenson Publishing Company,
Inc., 1969, pp. 39-67.
Periodicals
"A New Look at Audit Fees," Financial Executive, Vol. 4 2
(September, 1974), pp. 42-43.
"Audit Fees--How Much for Responsibility?" The C .P .A . ,
Vol. 44 (May, 1974), pp. 67-68.
Axelson, K„ S.
"Are Consulting and Auditing Compatible?"
The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 115 (April, 1963),
pp. 54-58.
Bab, Donald Stuart.
"The CPA's Expanding Legal Liability,"
The Practical Accountant, Vol. 6 (March/April, 1973),
pp. 4 3-50.

125
Bedingfield, James P.
"The Effect of Recent Litigation on
Audit Practice," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 137
(May, 1974), pp. 55-62.
Bedingfield, James P . , and Stephen E. Loeb.
"Auditor
Changes— An Examination," The Journal of Accountancy,
Vol. 137 (March, 1974), pp. 66-69.
"Brokers Must Notify SEC of Shift in Accountants," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 134 (September, 1972) ,
p. 14.
Burton, J. C.
"The S.E.C. and the World of Accounting in
1974," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 138 (July,
1974), pp. 59-60.
Burton, John C., and William Roberts.
"A Study of Auditor
Changes," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 123 (April,
1967), pp. 31-36.
Carmichael, Douglas R.
"Changing Auditors and Audit Re
sponsibilities," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 130
(November, 1970), pp. 70-73.
Carmichael, D. R . , and R. J. Swieringa.
"The Compatibility
of Auditing Independence and Management Services— An
Identification of Issues," The Accounting Review, Vol.
43 (October, 1968), pp. 697-705.
Carey, J. L . , and W. 0. Doherty.
"The Concept of Independ
ence:
Review and Restatement," The Journal of Account
ancy, Vol. 121 (January, 1966), pp. 38-48.
Causey, Denzil Y . , Jr.
"Newly Emerging Standards of Audi
tor Responsibility," The Accounting Review, Vol. 51
(January, 1976), pp. 19-30.
Chan, Stephen.
"Reliance on Reports of Other Auditors,"
The New York Certified Public Accountant, Vol. 40
(February, 1970), pp. 119-23.
Chazen, Charles, and Kenneth I. Solomon.
"The Art of De
fensive Auditing," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol.
140 (October, 1975), pp. 66-71.
Cohen, Gerald B . , and Robert Israeloff.
"A Minimum Fee
Schedule for Accountants?" The CPA Journal (May, 1972),
pp. 412-414.
Earle, Victor M . , III.
"The Litigation Explosion," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 129 (March, 1970),
pp. 65-67.

126
Eder, Bernard B.
"A Three-Step Method of Arriving at a
Fair Fee," The Practical Accountant, Vol. 5 (July/
August, 1972), pp. 28-29.
Eder, Bernard B.
"Fee Increases: When, How Much, and
How?" The Practical Accountant, Vol. 7 (July/August,
1974), pp. 26-28.
Eder, Bernard B.
"Questions and Answers About Billing and
Fees," The Practical Accountant, Vol. 5 (May/June,
1972), pp. 46-47.
Eder, Bernard B.
"Setting Fees for Unusual Services," The
Practical Accountant, Vol. 4 (March/April, 1971),
pp. 36-37.
Eder, Bernard B.
"The Positive Approach to Quoting a
Fee," The Practical Accountant, Vol. 5 (March/April,
1972), p. 15.
Fee, Thomas.
"Controlling the Audit Fee," Management
Accounting, Vol. 56 (February, 1975), pp. 49-51.
Frisbee, Ira N.
"How Personal Attributes of the Auditor
Affect the Application of Auditing Standards," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 89 (February, 1950),
pp. 120-124.
Fritzmeyer, Joe R.
"Seven Rules for Minimizing the Risks
of Liability," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 127
(June, 1969), pp. 64-65.
Fritzmeyer, Joe R . , and Douglas R. Carmichael, ed.
"Chang
ing Auditors and Audit Responsibilities," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 130 (November, 1970), pp. 70-73.
Fritzmeyer, Joe R., and Douglas R. Carmichael.
"Lack of
Independence— Some Reporting Problems," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 134 (August, 1972), pp. 78-81.
Gadarowski, James J.
"The Accountant's Liability for
Negligence— How Far?" The Connecticut CPA, Vol. 38
(December, 1974), pp. 24-26.
Gibson, Charles.
"Analysis of Continental Vending Machine
(U. S. v. Simon)," Ohio CPA, Vol. 30 (Winter, 1971),
pp. 8-16.
Gibson, Charles.
"Analysis of Yale Express (Fischer v.
Kletz)," The Michigan CPA, Vol. 23 (July/August,
1971), pp. 5-7.

127
Goldman, Arieh, and Benzion Bariev.
"The Auditor-Firm
Conflict of Interests:
Its Implications for Independ
ence," The Accounting Review, Vol. 49 (October, 1974),
pp. 707-718.
Hampson, J. Jay.
"Accountants' Liability--The Signifi
cance of Hochfelder," The Journal of Accountancy,
Vol. 146 (December, 1976), pp. 69-74.
Higgins, Thomas G.
"Professional Ethics: A Time for Re
appraisal," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 113
(March, 1962), p. 31.
Hoyle, Joe.
"Mandatory Auditor Rotation:
The Arguments
and An Alternative," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol.
145 (May, 1978), pp. 69-78.
Kennedy, Michael M.
"Accountants' Liability Overview,"
Pennsylvania CPA Spokesman, Vol. 46 (November, 1975),
pp. 5-6.
Lavin, David.
"Perceptions of the Independence of the
Auditor," The Accounting Review, Vol. 51 (January,
1976), pp. 41-50.
Levine, Arnold, and E. Stanley Marks.
"Accountants' Lia
bility Insurance— Perils and Pitfalls," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 142 (October, 1976), pp. 59-64.
Liggio, Carl D.
"The Expectation Gap: The Accountant's
Legal Waterloo?" The C.P.A., Vol. 45 (July, 1975) ,
pp. 23-29.
McLaren, N. Loyall.
"Rotation of Auditors," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 106 (July, 1958), pp. 41-44.
Mautz, Robert K.
"Rotation of Auditors," Financial Execu
tive , Vol. 42 (July, 1974), pp. 48-56.
Miller, Richard L . , Jr.
"Cases on Accountants' Liability—
Some Rules of Safe Practice," Pennsylvania CPA Spokes
man , Vol. 46 (November, 1975), pp. 7-13.
Morgan, W. H.
"The Objective Elements in a Fee," The
Accountants' Journal (New Zealand), Vol. 52 (October,
1973), pp. 114-115.
Morgan, W. H.
"The Subjective Elements in a Fee," The
Accountants' Journal (New Zealand), Vol. 52 (April,
1974), pp. 344-346.

128
"Moss Proposes a 'National Organization of S.E.C. Account
ancy,1" The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 146 (July,
1978), p. 3.
Neier, D. S.
"Using Work and Reports of Other Auditors,"
The New York Certified Public Accountant, Vol. 41
(October, 1971), pp. 721-725.
Nichols, Donald R . , and Kenneth H. Price.
"The AuditorFirm Conflict: Analysis Using Concepts of Exchange
Theory," The Accounting Review, Vol. 51 (April, 1976),
pp. 335-346.
Olson, Norman 0.
"The Auditor in Legal Difficulty-— What's
the Answer?" The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 129
(April, 1970), pp. 39-44.
Olson, Wallace E.
"A Look at the Responsibility Gap," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 139 (January, 1975),
pp. 52-57.
Olson, Wallace E.
"How Should a Profession Be Disciplined?"
The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 145 (May, 1978),
pp. 59-66.
"Proposed SAS Details Communication Between Old and New
Auditors," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 139
(March, 1975), pp. 25-26.
Rea, Richard C.
"Explaining Fees to Clients," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 129 (January, 1970), pp. 75-76.
Reiling, Henry B . , and Russell A. Taussig.
"Recent Liabil
ity Cases— Implications for Accountants," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 130 (September, 1970), pp. 39-53.
"Rotation and Selection of External Auditing Firms," The
Internal Auditor (November/December, 1973), pp. 94-96.
Schlosser, Robert E.
"An Historical Approach to the Con
cept of Independence," The New York Certified Public
Accountant, Vol. 39 (July, 1969), pp. 517-527.
Schultz, A. A., Jr.
"Compatibility of Management Consult
ing and Auditing," The Accounting Review, Vol. 41
(July, 1965), pp. 589-593.
"S.E.C. Accounting Series Release No. 126:
Independence of
Accountants:
Guidelines and Examples of Situations
Involving the Independence of Accountants," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 134 (September, 1972),
pp. 83-89.

129
"S.E.C. Chairman's Report to Congress," The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. 146 (July, 1978), p. 3.
Sharaf, Hussein A., and R. K. Mautz.
"An Operational Con
cept of Independence," The Journal of Accountancy,
Vol. 109 (April, 1960), pp. 49-54.
"A Sharper Definition of the Auditor's Job," Business Week
(March 28, 1977), pp. 55-56.
Sterling, Robert R.
"Accounting Power," The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. 135 (January, 1973), pp. 61-67.
Taper, Eugene.
"Independence— Our Public Image," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 126 (August, 1968),
pp. 65-67.
"The AICPA Division of CPA Firms," The Journal of Account
ancy, Vol. 144 (November, 1977), pp. 113-117.
"The Annual Audit Revisited," Financial Executive, Vol.
46 (March, 1978), pp. 38-44.
Titard, Pierre L.
"Independence and M.A.S.— Opinions of
Financial Statement Users," The Journal of Accountancy,
Vol. 132 (July, 1971), pp. 47-52.
Trueblood, Robert M.
"The Management Service Function in
Public Accounting," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol.
112 (July, 1961), pp. 37-44.
Wallace, William P.
"A Look at Audit Committees and the
Auditor's Independence," Canadian Charted Accountant,
Vol. 95 (July, 1969), pp. 17-19.
Winters, Alan J.
"Looking at the Auditor Rotation Issue,"
Management Accounting, Vol. 57 (March, 1976), pp. 2930.
Wyatt, A. R.
"Competence and Independence in Accounting,"
The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 133 (April, 1972),
pp. 71-74.

APPENDIX A
The Questionnaires
Appendix A presents the questionnaires mailed in
this study.

It contains the transmittal letters to the

controllers and the CPAs, and the two questionnaires that
were sent to the controllers and the CPAs.
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M EM PH IS, T E N N E S S E E 38152

D e p a r t m e n t of A c c o u n t a n c y

February 27, 1978

Dear Controller:
The improving of accounting and auditing for all clients is a com
mon goal of all professional accountants. Recently there has been a
great deal of concern about federal controls being placed on the pro
fession as a way to improve accounting and auditing.
In an effort to determine ways in which the accounting profession
can provide better service to its clients without federal intervention,
my doctoral dissertation from Louisiana State University is exploring
the area of "Selection, Rotation and Retention of Independent Auditors."
Since the opinions of those who use independent auditors will have a
tearing on the future of the profession, I must ccme to you to ask
your opinion on this topic. By answering the enclosed questionnaire
you will be supplying important information as to whether the users of
independent auditors feel that services to their firm might be improved.
Your individual responses to the questions will be kept confidential.
The number on the questionnaire is for follow-up purposes only. A return,
postage-paid envelope is enclosed for your convenience.
If you would kindly take the time now frcm your busy schedule and
answer the enclosed questionnaire and return it before March 15, 1978,
I would greatly appreciate your time and effort.
Sincerely,

Mrs. Sarah C. Dawkins
Assistant Professor of
Accountancy
SCD./ds
ENCLOSURE
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A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE
SELECTION, ROTATION AND RETENTION OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
1.

Does your corporation have an audit ccntittee?

Yes

No___

2.

Does tne audit ccrrriittee select the outside C.P.A. firm?

3.

If the answer to #2 is Mo, then who does select the C.P.A. firm to perform the
annual audit?

4.

How long has the present auditing firm been auditing your corporation?

5.

Does your corporation change auditing firms on a regular basis?

6.

If yes, how regularly?

7.

Do you feel that an auditor may became lax in his approach to the audit engage
ment of the same company ever a pericd of years? Yes
No ___

3.

Do you feel that after a pericd of years with the same corporation as a client,
an auditor may be considered less than independent? Yes
No ___

9.

Do you favor a policy of automatically changing independent, auditing firms on
a routine basis? Yes
No

Yes

No

Yes

years
No___

Every 1-2 years? ________
Every 3-5 years? ________
More than 5 years _______

-N.

10.

If yes, hew often should they be changed?

Every 1-2 years? ______
3-5 years? ______
More than 5 years? ____

11.

Do you feel that by changing auditors on a routine basis your corporation would
be provided with a more objective evaluation of your accounting system and
financial statements? Yes
No ___

12.

V.hy do you feel as you do?

13. Do ycu foresee any chance which your corporation will make in the future with
recard to the policy of selecting tne independent C.P.A. firm?

14. Please 'use the back of this page to make any further cawnents.

Return to:

Mrs. Sarah C. Dawkins, Department of Accountancy, Rocm 200, College of
Business Administration, Mer.chis State University, Manonis, Tennessee
38152

i
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MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38152
'WCM*''

D e p a r t m e n t o f A c c o u n ta n c y

March 10, 1978

Dear CPA:
The improving of accounting and auditing for all clients
is a common goal of all professional accountants. Recently there
has been a great deal of concern about federal controls being placed
on the profession as a way to improve accounting and auditing.
In an effort to determine ways in which the accounting pro
fession can provide better service to its clients without federal
intervention, my doctoral dissertation from Louisiana State Universi
ty is exploring the area of "Selection, Rotation and Retention of
Independent Auditors." Since the opinions of those who render ser
vices to clients will determine the future actions of the profession
as a whole, I must ccme to you to ask your opinion on this topic.
By answering the enclosed questionnaire you will be supplying import
ant information as to how services to clients can be better improved.
Your individual responses to the questions will be kept
confidential. The number on the questionnaire is for follow-up pur
poses only. A return, postage-paid envelope is enclosed for your
convenience.
If you would kindly take the time now from your busy
schedule and answer the enclosed questionaire and return it before
April 1, 1978. I would greatly appreciate your time and effort.
Sincerely,

Mrs. Sarah C. Dawkins
Assistant Professor of
Accountancy
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A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE
SELECTION, ROTATION AND RETENTION OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
1.

What percentage of the corporations that you audit have audit committees?______

2. In the corporations that have audit ccnmittees, dees the audit oonmittee select the
outside independent C.P.A. firm to perform the annual audit? Yes
No_____
3. If the answer to #2 is No, who does select the outside C.P.A. firm?_______________
4. In corporations that do not have an audit committee, who selected your firm as the
independent C.P.A. firm?___________________________________________________
5.

Do your clients have a tendency to change auditing*firms on a regular basis?
Yes__________________ No________________

6. If yes, how many clients follow a policy of regularly changing or rotating the
audit firm which performs their annual audit?______________
7. How often do your clients change audit firms?
,.

Every 1-2 years?________
Every 3-5 years?______
More than 5 years?_______

8. Within your C.P.A firm, is there a policy of rotating on a periodic basis the staff
assistants on a given client's audit? Yes_______No________
9. If so, how often?______________
10. Is there a policy of rotating on a periodic basis the senior accountant on a given
client's audit? Yes________No__________
11. If so, how often?
12. Is there a policy of rotating the manager in charge of a given client's audit?
Yes___________ No___________
13. If so, hew

often?___________________

14. Is there a policy of rotating the partner in charge of a given client's audit?
Yes_______ N o ___________
15. If so, how

often?__________________

16. In light of the Metcalf Report and the proceedings of the Senate Subcommittee with
regard to studying how to improve accounting and auditing, it is necessary for the
accounting profession to take seme measures toward self-regulation. With this in
mind, do you feel that the future may hold a policy of compulsory rotation of
C.P.A. firms among clients? Yes_______No_________
1/. Do you feel that such a policy would increase an auditor's independence, which is
a primary ethical consideration in the accounting profession? Yes
No
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18.

Do you feel that such a policy would cause an auditor to be more objective in his
dealings with clients? Yes_______ No________

19.

How do you feel about a policy of rotating auditing firms among clients on a routine
b asis?

20.

Please use the remainder of this page to make any further comrtents.

Return to:

Mrs. Sarah C. Dawkins, Department of Accountancy, Roan 200, College of Business
Administration, Menphis State University, Menphis, Tennessee 33152
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APPENDIX B
The Fortune 500
Appendix B contains a list of the largest United
States industrial companies.

The controller of each of

these 500 companies received a questionnaire, an example
of which is presented in Appendix A.
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FORTUNE'S 500
Largest U. S. Industrial Corporations
ACF Industries, Inc.
A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.
AMAX, Inc.
AMF, Inc.
AMP, Inc.
A. 0. Smith Corp.
A-T-0, Inc.
Abbott Laboratories
Addressograph Multigraph Corp.
Adolph Coors
Agway, Inc.
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.
Airco, Inc.
Akzona, Inc.
Alco Standard Corp.
Allegheny Ludlum Industries
Allied Chemical Corp.
Allis-Chalmers Corp.
Alumax, Inc.
Aluminum Company of America
Amerada Hess Corp.
American Bakeries Co.
American Beef Packers
American Brands, Inc.
American Broadcasting Companies
American Can Co.
American Chain & Cable Corp.
American Cyanamid Co.
American Hoist & Derrick Co.
American Home Products Corp.
American Motors Corp.
American Petrofina Corp.
American Standard, Inc.
Amstar Corp.
Amsted Industries, Inc.
Amtel, Inc.
Anaconda Co.
Anchor Hocking Corp.
Anderson, Clayton & Co.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.
Armco
Armstrong Cork Co.

Arvin Industries, Inc.
Asarco, Inc.
Ashland Oil, Inc.
Associated Milk Producers
Atlantic Richfield Co.
Avco Corp.
Avnet, Inc.
Avon Products, Inc.
B. F. Goodrich Co.
Babcock & Wiley Co., Inc.
Baker International Corp.
Ball Corp.
Bausch and Lomb, Inc.
Baxter Travenol Labs.
Beatrice Foods Co.
Becton, Dickinson & Co.
Belco Petroleum Corp.
Bell & Howell Co.
Bemis C o ., Inc.
Bendix Corp.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Black & Decker Mfg. Corp.
Blue Bell, Inc.
Bluebird, Inc.
Boeing Co.
Boise Cascade Corp.
Borden, Inc.
Borg-Warner Corp.
Briggs & Stratton Corp.
Bristol-Myers Co.
Brockway Glass Co.
Brown Group, Inc.
Brunswick Corp.
Bucyrun-Erie Co.
Budd Co.
Burlington Industries, Inc,
Burroughs Corp.
CBS, Inc.
CF Industries, Inc.
CPC International
Cabot Corp.
Cameron Iron Works, Inc.
Campbell Soup Co„
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Campbell Taggert, Inc.
Cannon Mills Co.
Carborundum Co.
Carnation Co.
Carrier Corp.
Castle & Cooke, Inc.
Caterpillar Tractor Co.
Celanese Corp.
Central Soya Co., Inc.
Cerro-Marmon Corp.
Cessna Aircraft Co.
Certain-teed Corp.
Champion International Corp.
Champion Spark Plug Co.
Charter Co.
Chemetron Corp.
Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.
Chromalloy American Corp.
Chrysler Corp.
Cincinnati Milacron, Inc.
Cities Service Co.
Clark Equipment Co.
Clark Oil & Refining Corp.
Clorox Co.
Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc.
Coca-Cola Co., Inc.
Colgate-Palmolive
Collins & Aikman Corp.
Colt Industries, Inc.
Columbia Pictures Industries
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Commonwealth Oil Refining
Con-Agra, Inc.
Cone Mills Corp.
Congoleum Corp.
Consolidated Aluminum Corp.
Consolidated Foods Corp.
Container Corp. of America
Continental Group, Inc.
Continental Oil Co.
Control Data Corp.
Cook Industries, Inc.
Cooper Industries
Corning Glass Works, Inc.
Crane Co.
Crown Central Petroleum
Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.
Crown Zellerbach

Cummins Engine Co., Inc.
Curtiss-Wright Corp.
Cutler-Hammer, Inc.
Cyclops Corp.
Cyprus Mines Corp.
Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.
Dan River, Inc.
Dana Corp.
Dart Industries, Inc.
Dayco Corp.
Deere & Co.
Del Monte Corp.
Diamond International Corp.
Diamond Shamrock Corp.
Digital Equipment
Dover Corp.
Dow Chemical Co.
Dresser Industries, Inc.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.
Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc.
Eastman Kodak Co.
Eaton Corp.
Economics Labs., Inc.
Eli Lilly & Co.
Eltra Corp.
Emerson Electric Co.
Emhart Corp.
Envirotech Corp.
Esmark, Inc.
Ethyl Corp.
Evans Products Co.
Ex-Cell-0 Corp.
Exxon Corp.
FMC Corp.
Fairmont Foods Co.
Farmland Industries, Inc.
Federal Co.
Federal-Mogul Corp.
Federal Paper Board Co.
Ferro Corp.
Fieldcrest Mills, Inc.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Flavorland Industries, Inc.
Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc.
Flintkote Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Foster Wheeler Corp.
Foxboro Co.
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Fruehauf Corp.
Fuqua Industries, Inc.
GAF Corp.
GATX Corp.
G. D. Searle & Co.
Gannett Co., Inc.
Gardner-Denver Co.
General Cable Corp.
General Dynamics Corp.
General Electric Co.
General Foods Corp.
General Host Corp.
General Instrument Corp.
General Mills, Inc.
General Motors Corp.
General Refractories Co.
General Signal Corp.
General Tire & Rubber Co.
Genesco, Inc.
George A. Hormel & Co.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Gerber Products Co.
Getty Oil Co.
Gillette Co.
Gold Kist, Inc.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber C o .
Gould, Inc.
Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.
Great Western United Corp.
Green Giant Co.
Greyhound Corp.
Grumman Corp.
Gulf & Western Industries, Inc.
Gulf Oil Corp.
H. H. Robertson Co.
H. J. Heinz Co.
H. P. Hood, Inc.
Hammermill Paper
Handy & Harman
Hanes Corp.
Hanna Mining Co.
Harnischfeger Corp.
Harris Corp.
Harsco Corp.
Hart Schaffner & Marx
Hercules, Inc.
Hershey Foods
Heublein, Inc.
Hewlett-Packard Co.
Hobart Corp.
Hoerner Waldorf Corp.
Honeywell, Inc.

Hoover Co.
Hughes Tool Co.
Hygrade Food Products Corp.
Hyster Co.
IC Industries, Inc.
I-T-E Imperial
Idle Wild Foods, Inc.
Indian Head, Inc.
Ingersoll-Rand Co.
Inland Container Corp.
Inland Steel Co.
Inmont Corp.
Insilco Corp.
Interco, Inc.
Interlake, Inc.
International Bus. Machines
International Harvester Co.
International Minerals & Chem.
International Multifoods Corp.
International Paper Co.
International Systems Controls
International Tele. & Tele.
Interstate Brands Corp.
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.
J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
Jim Walter Corp.
Johns-Manville Corp.
Johnson & Johnson
Jonathan Logan, Inc.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.
Joy Manufacturing Co.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Kaiser Industries Corp.
Kane-Miller Corp.
Kayser-Roth
Kellogg Co.
Kellwood Co.
Kennecott Copper Corp.
Kerr-McGee Corp.
Kewanee Industries, Inc.
Keystone Consolidated Indus.
Kimberly-Clark'Corp.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.
Koehring Co.
Koppers Co., Inc.
Kraftco Corp.
LTV Corp.
Land O'Lakes, Inc.
Lear Siegler, Inc.
Lever Brothers Co.
Levi Strauss & Co.
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Libby, McNeill & Libby
Libby-Owens-Ford Co.
Liggett & Myers
Litton Industries, Inc.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
Lone Star Industries, Inc.
Louisiana-Pacific Corp.
Lubrizol Corp.
Lykes-Youngstown Corp.
MAPCO, Inc.
MBPXL Corp.
MCA, Inc.
M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc.
Macmillan, Inc.
Marathon Oil Co.
Martin Marietta Corp.
Masco Corp.
Mattel, Inc.
McConnel Douglas Corp.
McGraw-Edison Co.
McGraw-Hill, Inc.
McLouth Steel Corp.
Mead Corp.
Merck & Co., Inc.
Midland-Ross Corp.
Miles Labs., Inc.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Mobil Oil Corp.
Mohasco
Monfort of Colorado, Inc.
Monsanto Co.
Morton-Norwich Products, Inc.
Motorola, Inc.
Murphy Oil Corp.
NCR Corp.
NL Industries, Inc.
NVF Co., Inc.
Nabisco, Inc.
Nalco Chemical Co.
Nashua Corp.
National Can Corp.
National Distillers & Chem.
National Gypsum Co.
National Service Industries
National Steel
Newmont Mining Corp.
New York Times Co.
Norris Industries, Inc.
North American Philips Corp.
Northrop Corp.
Northwest Industries, Inc.

Northwestern Steel & Wire
Norton Co.
Norton Simon, Inc.
Occidental Petroleum Co.
Ogden Corp.
Oil Shale Corp.
Olin Corp.
Oscar Mayer & Co., Inc.
Outboard Marine Corp.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Owens-Illinois, Inc.
PPG Industries, Inc.
Pabst Brewing Co.
Paccar, Inc.
Parker-Hannifen Corp.
Peabody Coal Co.
Peabody Galion Corp.
Peavey Co.
PepsiCo, Inc.
Pennwalt Corp.
Pennzoil Co.
Perkin-Elmer Corp.
Pet, Inc.
Pfizer, Inc.
Phelps Dodge Corp.
Philip Morris, Inc.
Phillips Petroleum Co.
Phillips-Van Heusen Corp.
Pillsbury Co.
Pitney-Bowes, Inc.
Pittston Co.
Polaroid Corp.
Potlatch Corp.
Proctor & Gamble Co.
Pullman, Inc.
Purex Corp.
Quaker Oats Co.
Questor Corp.
RCA Corp.
R. J. Reynolds Industries
R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co.
Ralston Purina Co.
Rath Packing Co.
Raytheon Co.
Reliance Electric Co.
Republic Steel Corp.
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.
Revlon, Inc.
Reynolds Metals Co.
Rexnord, Inc.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
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Rischhold Chemicals, Inc.
Riviana Foods, Inc.
Rockwell International Corp.
Rohm & Haas Co.
Rohr Industries, Inc.
Roper Corp.
SCM Corp.
St. Joe Minerals Corp.
St. Regis Paper Co.
Savannah Foods & Indus.
Saxon Industries, Inc.
Schering-Plough Corp.
Scott Paper Co.
Scoville Mfg. Co.
Seaboard Allied Milling Corp.
Shelber-Globe Corp.
Shell Oil Co.
Sherwin-Williams Co.
Signal C o ., Inc.
Signode Corp.
Simmons Co.
Singer Co.
SmithKline Corp.
Southwest Forest Industries
Spencer Foods, Inc.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
Sperry Rand Corp.
Springs Mills, Inc.
Square D
Squibb Corp.
Standard Brands, Inc.
Standard Oil Co. of Calif.
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana)
Standard Oil Co. (Ohio)
Stanley Works
Stauffer Chemical Co.
Sterling Drug, Inc.
Stokeley-Van Camp, Inc.
Studebaker-Worthington, Inc.
SuCrest Corp.
Sun C o ., Inc.
Sunbeam Corp.
Sundstrand Corp.
Superior Oil Co., Inc.
Sybron Corp.
TRW, Inc.
Talley Industries, Inc.
Tecumseh Products Co.
Tektronix, Inc.
Teledyne, Inc.
Tenneco, Inc.

Tesoro Petroleum Corp.
Texaco, Inc.
Texas Instruments, Inc.
Texasgulf, Inc.
Textron, Inc.
Thiokol Corp.
Thomas J. Lipton, Inc.
Time, Inc.
Times Mirror Co.
Timken Co.
Trane Co.
Trans Union Corp.
Twentieth Century Fox Film
USM Corp.
U. S. Gypsum Co.
U. S. Industries, Inc.
U. S. Steel Corp.
UV Industries, Inc.
Union Camp Corp.
Union Carbide Corp.
Union Oil Co. of Calif.
Uniroyal, Inc.
United Brands Co.
United Merchants & Mfgs.
United Refining Co.
United Technologies Corp.
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.
Upjohn Co.
Utah International, Inc.
VF Corp.
Varian Association
Vulcan Materials Co.
W. R. Grace & Co.
Wallace-Murray Corp.
Walter Kidde & Co., Inc.
Ward Foods, Inc,
Warnaco, Inc.
Warner Communications, Inc.
Warner-Lambert Co.
Washington Post Co.
Wean United, Inc.
West Point-Pepperell, Inc.
Western Electric Co., Inc.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Westmoreland Coal Co.
Westvaco Corp.
Weyerhaeuser Co.
Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Whirlpool Corp.
White Consolidated Indus.

White Motor Corporation
Whittaker Corp.
Willamette Industries, Inc.
William Wrigley, Jr., Co.
Williams Companies
Witco Chemical Corp.
Xerox Corp.
Zenith Radio Corp.
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